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ABSTRACT 
Kicking the Can is a video documentary that explores the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
socio-political factors that led to the collapse. The documentary was produced over the course of 
a year and a half, and contains interviews with economists, politicians, academics, and U.S. 
citizens. Kicking the Can ultimately reveals that the financial crisis is a complex issue that can be 
analyzed and interpreted from a variety of political and social perspectives. This paper documents 
the making of the film, the production involved, and the process of working with collaborators and 
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In the fall of 2010, I was offered the opportunity to work with Daniels College of Business 
MBA students on a documentary concerning the financial crisis of 2008. Along with Johnny Rutter 
and Will Gardner—fellow classmates at the Media, Film & Journalism Studies department—I took 
up the offer. We were initially promised at least $50,000 for our budget. Ultimately (and 
unfortunately), we were told that the business school did not have the money to finance the 
project. Throughout the process of waiting for budget approval, crewmates began to drop out of 
the project. We started off with eight people and eventually ended up with three. Johnny Rutter, 
Will Gardner, and I were the main individuals involved with the documentary. 
Despite the setbacks we experienced, Dean Anne McCall of Arts, Humanities and Social 
Sciences (AHSS), was able to fund a portion of our originally promised budget, and we were able 
to buy equipment to shoot the project. With money, the team was finally beginning to move 
forward with the production of the documentary. I found that as I read more about the crisis and 
saw more documentaries related to the crisis, the more interested I become in the project. 
Initially, I felt like more of an individual who was just “tagging along” to make the film. But, after 
doing more research for the project, my eyes were opened to some very fundamental problems 
involving the country’s financial and monetary system. I began feeling much more compelled to 
tell the story of the crisis and those who were affected. It was becoming much less of an abstract 
thing after research, and because of that, I was feeling more ambitious about making the film, 
despite the budget and crew difficulties.  
Because the budget was scaled back significantly, the team had to reduce the overall 
scope of the project. We originally planned to make a feature length film that looked at the crisis 
from a national scale, but because we no longer had the budget to travel around the country and 
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interview people in different cities, we settled to make a short documentary that focused on the 
localized economy in Colorado.  
I functioned mostly as the director of photography and assisted with production and 
arrangement of shoots. Will worked as the editor and Johnny was our director. Although we gave 
ourselves these titles (and fulfilled our respective duties under these titles), our positions were 
very much interchangeable and we took on tasks outside of our assigned roles. My behind-the-
scenes work consisted of gathering human interest stories and interviewees for the film, as well 
as helping out with post-production. I didn’t expect to be on-screen that much, but I did plan on 
being in front of the camera to conduct some of the human interest interviews. However, the task 
of finding individuals who were affected by the crisis and willing to go on-camera proved to be 
extremely difficult. Ultimately, I only conducted one interview. This will be detailed later in chapter 
two.  
To begin, I will reiterate the thesis proposal which discusses the planned filmmaking 
process and documentary framework that the production team laid out. The proposal was 
designed as a working blueprint for the successful execution and completion of the film. It also 
provides a background to the crisis, detailing the books and documentaries that were made about 
the financial downturn. The original proposal drafted with Daniels College is attached to this 








Chapter One: The Proposal 
 
Mission 
To create a high quality documentary film on issues related to the financial crisis and its 
impact on our community. 
 
 Vision 
 In September 2008, the U.S. economy was crippled as massive mortgage foreclosures 
infected the financial services industry. The problem was systemic and essentially a product of 
unsound fiscal policy on Wall Street and Capitol Hill. With a lack of government oversight and 
regulation, Wall Street’s practices ultimately led to an economic downturn that has now affected 
every American in one way or another. And the problem has not been confined to just the United 
States; the entire global economy has been affected.  
        Although the crisis is a widespread problem, we intend to explore how people within 
Colorado have dealt with the downturn. Businesses, lawmakers, and individuals have been faced 
with a variety of hardships related to the crisis, and we believe that much can be learned from 
these stories that have emerged. The weight of the crisis has made a significant portion of our 
population jobless, and in some cases homeless. Businesses have been forced to make serious 
cutbacks and lawmakers have attempted to remedy these problems. This documentary will 
attempt to tell these stories. If the film can at least inform people of the crisis—and how it 
continues to affect individuals—then it is possible to inspire people to demand certain 
fundamental changes to the country’s political and financial systems. We believe that our 





         Much has been written about the financial meltdown of 2008. An important book that 
covers the crisis is Matt Taibbi’s Griftopia. Griftopia is composed of seven individual essays that 
cover different aspects of the crisis, and a chapter—entitled “Hot Potato”—provides invaluable 
insight into the structures that existed that allowed the financial mortgage crisis to happen. It 
details—in a very easy to understand vernacular— how the mortgage market was being diluted 
with bad investments, and even how responsible homeowners were duped into taking out 
mortgages that would eventually hurt them. 
In “Hot Potato” Taibbi tells the story of man named Eljon Williams, who meets a self-
described mortgage expert by the name of Solomon Edwards. Williams instantly forms a 
friendship with Edwards, whom Williams genuinely believes to be an advocate for underprivileged 
and low-income homeowners. Edwards eventually helps Williams secure a fixed-rate mortgage 
for a new house, but trouble arises when Williams receives a note from his mortgage owner, 
informing him that the interest on his adjustable rate mortgage has been increased. Believing this 
information to be a mistake (the mortgage is supposed to be fixed-rate), Williams phones 
Edwards to mend the situation. Williams insists that the mortgage promised to him was fixed-rate, 
but Edwards tells him that it was adjustable, and that he had been told that from the beginning. 
Edwards stops answering Williams’s calls and eventually disappears completely. Williams soon 
realizes that he’s been scammed and that Edwards had actually made $12,000 by rigging the 
appraisal of the property (it turns out that Edwards was the appraiser). Amid this whole situation, 
Williams’s wife is diagnosed with ovarian cancer, which causes a great deal of financial difficulty 
for the family. 
In an attempt to work the situation out, Williams contacts America’s Servicing Company 
(the owner of his mortgage). He explains to them his wife’s life-or-death medical situation and the 
deceitful circumstances surrounding the issuance of his mortgage. He pleads with ASC to modify 
their loan, but is ultimately told there is nothing that they can do. Taibbi then goes on to explain 
just how the Williamses landed themselves in this situation. It turns out that Edwards falsified the 
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Williams’s credit score so that it actually represented a much lower creditworthiness than they 
were actually worth, qualifying them for a subprime loan, when in actuality they would have 
qualified for a regular, fixed loan. By pushing a subprime mortgage, Edwards was able to make 
much more of a commission than if he had given the Williamses a prime loan. Edwards had also 
doctored the loan application so that Clara, Eljon’s wife, appeared to make $7,000 more a month 
than she really earned. 
Taibbi then explains the exact nature of the relationship between mortgage lenders and 
investment banks to illustrate the larger context of the Williamses’ situation. The mortgage 
lenders’ “job” was to create a large number of loans in any way possible, and while this might 
have presented a problem for lenders in the past (they would have not been as likely to lend to 
those who couldn’t pay back their loans), the age of securitization allowed for quick money to be 
made off of these subprime loans. Instead of making the loans and waiting until they reached 
maturity, securitization allowed for banks to pool various mortgages together, where they could 
then be sold off to other investors as securities. The basic principle behind securitization is that it 
allows for short-term cash to be made off of long-term streams of income. Prior to the advent of 
securitization in the 1970s, money could only be generated and accessed through the monthly 
payments made by homeowners. However, after the invention of securitization, banks could take 
their loans, group them together, and “sell the future revenue streams to another party for a big 
lump sum—instead of making $3 million over thirty years, maybe you make $1.8 million up front, 
today” (84). 
Lenders were still limited in the sense that they didn’t want to buy mortgages unless they 
were actually good loans and could be paid back. But, with CDOs (collateralized debt obligation), 
banks could generate significant cash-flow. By creating a tiered system in which pooled 
mortgages were rated, shares of mortgages could then be sold to outside investors. CDOs work 
by splitting the mortgage pool into three sections and assigning a rating to each section. Investors 
who bought shares in the top tier—referred to as “AAA”—were the first to be paid when mortgage 
payments were made by homeowners. These investors were almost always guaranteed their 
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money, but AAA rated CDO securities tended not to generate large amounts of cash. The second 
tier—the “B” level—had a potentially higher pay-out to investors, but if mortgage lenders were not 
able to collect the minimum amount of money needed from homeowners, these investors were 
not paid at all. The lowest tier—often referred to as “toxic waste”—allowed for the highest 
potential rate of return, but was the riskiest to invest in. Investors who bought shares in toxic 
mortgages were essentially engaged in high-risk gambling; they faced high pay-outs if mortgages 
were paid, but they also faced a high likelihood of not making anything at all. CDOs changed the 
way in which banks made their investments:  
“[They] allowed lenders to get around the loan quality problem by hiding the crappiness of 
their loans behind the peculiar alchemy of the collateralized structure... now the relative 
appeal of a mortgage-based investment was not based on the individual borrower’s 
ability to pay over the long term; instead, it was based on computations like ‘what is the 
likelihood that more than ninety-three out of one hundred homeowners with credit scores 
of at least 660 will default on their loans next month” (100)? 
 
This situation becomes even more problematic when you begin to understand just how 
the rating agencies functioned in rating the CDOs. The investment banks financed the same 
rating agencies that were rating their mortgage pools, and obviously, they were more likely to give 
a higher rating to packages that didn’t deserve a high rating. Goldman Sachs, for example, 
pooled together 8,274 mortgages in 2006 in a package called the “GSAMP Trust 2006-S3.” Of 
the mortgages in this package, the loan-to-value was 99.21%, meaning that the homeowners who 
had taken out these mortgages had paid less than 1% in down payment. 58% of these mortgage 
loans were considered “no-doc” or “low-doc,” “meaning there was little or no documentation, no 
proof that the owners were occupying the homes, were employed, or had access to any money at 
all” (86). Obviously, the mortgages in this package were toxic and practically destined to fail. 
However, 68% of the mortgages within this package were given an AAA rating. Moody’s, one of 
the two major rating agencies, came up with an excuse in May of 2008 that blamed a “computer 
error” on the over-rating of countless mortgage packages. 
Taibbi then relates how this entire structure of mortgage loans, securitization, and CDOs 
exists in context to the story told earlier of the Williams family and how they were conned by 
“mortgage expert” Solomon Edwards. The whole process begins with a mortgage broker like 
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Edwards, who works with a mortgage lender to issue a loan to a homeowner. At this level, 
mortgage brokers and lenders (like Edwards) are only interested in the immediate money that 
they can make for themselves. By issuing risky loans, they in-turn make more commission. From 
this level, the mortgage is sold off to an investment bank who then groups it into a securitized 
pool, where it can then be sold off to bigger investors. Because the lowest rated securities see 
the biggest potential cash return, there is a big interest by investors to buy shares of toxic 
mortgages. Taibbi explains the motivations to make such an investment: everybody involved is 
only concerned about the short-term benefits, and not thinking about the long-term sustainability 
of investment structures. Investors could:  
“buy the waste, cash in on the large returns for a while... and hope the homeowners... 
can keep making their pathetic 1 percent payments just long enough that that the hedge 
fund can eventually unload their loans on someone else before they start defaulting” (90).  
 
This short-term mentality existed throughout the entire chain of mortgage loans, and everybody 
involved seemed only interested in making a quick buck. The people at the bottom of this chain—
people like the Williamses—were ultimately hurt the most by this short-term lust for easy money. 
Taibbi explains how credit default swaps played an important role in the financial 
collapse. Credit default swaps, he clarifies, are a type of insurance policy that are essentially bets 
on a specific outcome in the market. The basic idea is that two bankers get together and bet 
against each on whether or not a homeowner will default on his or her mortgage. Banker A 
agrees to make a fixed payment every month to Banker B for a given length of time, so long as 
the mortgage isn’t defaulted on. If the homeowner defaults on their mortgage, Banker B has to 
pay Banker A the full amount of the original loan that was given to the homeowner. This used to 
be a simple insurance tool for banks, but two developments turned credit default swaps into a 
way to make large sums of money for investors. First off, no regulations existed to make sure that 
at least one of the parties involved in the credit default swap had a financial stake in the bond 
being bet on. Taibbi argues that this lack of regulation allowed banks to gamble on bonds in a 
way that was similar to “allowing people to buy life insurance on total strangers with late-stage 
lung cancer” (98). The second problem with credit default swaps was the fact that a bank did not 
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have to have any money at all before it sold credit default swap insurance. Taibbi then goes on to 
say that this type of conduct by Wall Street was worse than the activities of a casino (something 
Wall Street has routinely been compared to). Casinos, Taibbi explains, are at least regulated and 
do “not allow people to place bets they can’t cover” (98). 
“Hot Potato” is an engaging chapter of Griftopia that has the ability to convey both an 
emotional and intellectually engaging back-story of some of the individual factors that led to the 
financial meltdown. By telling the story of how Eljon Williams was duped into agreeing to a 
subprime mortgage against his knowledge, Taibbi is able to create a compassionate face that his 
audience can sympathize with. This humanistic element is exactly the story that we want to be 
able to tell in our film. It grounds the narrative of complex financial processes in something 
dramatic and emotional, and it defines Wall Street’s abuses in humanistic terms; it also illustrates 
the short-sighted policies and tactics that existed to make quick money off of innocent people. 
One thing becomes readily apparent when reading Williams’s story: the entire chain 
structure related to subprime mortgage lending was essentially based on the principle of 
disregarding the long-term sustainability of said structure. From the top to the bottom, the 
individuals involved were more concerned with lining their own pockets than looking out for the 
“little guy” or the overall health of the system. This is not just a systemic problem, but also a moral 
pitfall of those trying to make money on Wall Street. It will be important for us as a group to be 
able speak about these notions of corporate greed, but we need to be mindful that our purpose in 
this film is to talk about how these systemic and moral problems ultimately affected the innocent 
or unknowing homeowners at the bottom of the chain. 
Another important point to take away from “Hot Potato,” is that it illustrates exactly how 
the entire financial system in the United States had eventually become assembled into a row of 
dominoes, waiting to be pushed over. Wall Street had essentially figured out how to make money 
off of making money, and in turn created a system that couldn’t last. When homeowners began 
defaulting on their mortgages, it sent shockwaves through the entire U.S. financial market. 
Because the mortgage industry had become so intertwined with other forms of investments, there 
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was no way that investment banks could escape unscathed if homeowners started defaulting on 
their mortgages. When this finally happened in 2008, the government had to step in to fix the 
situation. 
Popular author Michael Lewis was a bond salesman on Wall Street during the 1980s, and 
wrote about the crisis in his 2010 book entitled The Big Short. The Big Short explores and 
attempts to answer exactly who knew about the forthcoming crisis in 2008, and ultimately, who 
benefitted from that knowledge. 
The book begins with Lewis’s story of speaking to Meredith Witney, a financial adviser, 
who lists a man named Steve Eisman as one of the figures who made billions off of betting 
against subprime mortgages—the same type of mortgages that were sinking Citigroup. The book 
shifts perspective, and then begins to tell the life story of Steve Eisman, an analyst at 
Oppenheimer securities. Eisman had believed that subprime lending was initially a good thing for 
lower-class Americans because it would move them away from higher interest rates with credit 
card debt, and to lower interest rates on mortgage debt. However, after hiring a man named 
Vinny Daniel to look into subprime lending, Eisman discovered that “subprime lending companies 
were growing so rapidly, and using such goofy accounting, that they could mask the fact that they 
had no real earnings, just illusory, accounting-driven, ones” (16). Eisman wrote a report about this 
in 1997, trashing subprime originators, and explaining that the numbers and statistics made 
public were in fact much different than the actual figures. 
Eisman then investigated lending giant Household Finance Corporation in 2002 and 
discovered how it was making a fortune off of second mortgages. By dishonestly offering 15-year 
loans that were “bizarrely disguised” as 30-year loans, Household could essentially double the 
effective interest rates of those they lent to. While Eisman’s investigation of Household revealed 
the deceitful tactics at play in consumer lending, it also revealed the unwillingness of the 
government to prosecute lenders who engaged in deceptive lending tactics. In a discussion with 
the Attorney General’s office of Washington state, Eisman discovered that the government was 
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unwilling to prosecute against Household because “[they were] a powerful company... if they’re 
gone, who would make subprime loans in the state of Washington” (18)? 
By 2004, Eisman was finally coming to the conclusion that consumer finance existed to 
essentially rip people off. In 2005, he had assembled a team to run his new hedge fund, and after 
meeting with major players on Wall Street, they all “shared a sense that a great many people 
working on Wall Street couldn’t possibly understand what they were doing” (23). Instead of 
learning a lesson from the subprime market crash of the 1990s, Wall Street was issuing subprime 
mortgages at an alarming rate, and the vast majority of these loans were being repackaged as 
mortgage bonds. Subprime lending was at an all-time high, and counter-intuitive to that, interest 
rates were rising. Eisman had also discovered that the terms of subprime loans had changed 
dramatically; while subprime mortgages had historically been issued mostly as fixed-rates, 75% 
of subprime loans were floating-rate by 2005. By this time, all major Wall Street investment banks 
were “deep into the subprime game” (24).  Eisman saw how this lending structure was 
unsustainable, and knew that he could make a substantial amount of money by short selling the 
stocks of investment banks when homeowners started defaulting. Eisman, along with a few other 
individuals, was able to see the collapse coming, and they made millions of dollars through short-
selling and credit default swaps. 
The Big Short re-enforces the major themes that emerged from Taibbi’s “Hot Potato” 
chapter in Griftopia. There was a general short-sightedness by banks and investors to make 
quick money, and in an attempt to generate more money, banks were repackaging bad subprime 
loans into mortgage bonds and selling them off to other investors. The Big Short also re-enforces 
the fact that mortgage lenders were using deceitful tactics to loan to homeowners at the bottom; 
by pushing bad mortgages, lenders could make much more money. The unwillingness of 
government to step in and take action against practices that seemed outright fraudulent is 
another theme that emerges from the book. But, one of the most important things to probably 
take away from The Big Short is that certain individuals foresaw the eventual collapse (and were 
able to make money off of it). 
11 
 
         Andrew Ross Sorkin’s book Too Big to Fail provides a detailed narrative of the financial 
bailout from the perspective of the major banks and government officials who had to bail them 
out. The last chapter of the book deals with the infamous meeting that took place between Henry 
Paulson and the CEOs of the “Big 9” Wall Street firms.  The chapter begins with Secretary of the 
Treasury Hank Paulson speaking with Chairman of the FDIC Sheila Bair, Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke, and President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Tim 
Geithner. Speaking with them in his office, Paulson ran through the talking points of their 
impending meeting with the “Big 9” CEOs. The most important aspect of their discussion was 
TARP—the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which would bail the banks out—something Sorkin 
calls the “equivalent of welfare checks, earmarked for the biggest banks in the nation” (521). 
Paulson, still preparing for his meeting, recited one of his talking points that he was about deliver 
to deliver to the CEOs:  
“To encourage wide participation, the program is designed to provide an attractive source 
of capital, on identical terms, to all qualifying financial institutions. We plan to announce 
the program tomorrow—and—that you nine firms will be the initial participants. We will 
state clearly that you are healthy institutions, participating in order to support the U.S. 
economy” (522). 
 
Geithner believed that this approach was too soft, and that the language needed to be toughened 
in order to get the CEOs to agree to their terms. To him, the pitch could not be interpreted as 
optional.  Paulson agreed, and a new talking point was drafted:  
“This is a combined program (bank liability and capital purchase). Your firms need to 
agree to both... We don’t believe it is tenable to opt out because doing so would leave 
you vulnerable and exposed... If capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware 
that your regulator will require it in any circumstance” (522). 
 
Paulson, Bair, Geithner, and Bernanke wondered if the CEOs would agree. When the 
“Big 9” CEOs arrived at Paulson’s office, it was the first (and possibly only) time in history that the 
most powerful heads of American finance were gathered in the same room. Paulson proceeded 
to tell them that they needed to accept the TARP money:  
“We regret having to take these actions... but let me be clear: If you don’t take it and you 
aren’t able to raise the capital that they say you need in the market, then I’m going to give 
you a second helping and you’re not going to like the terms on that... This is the right 
thing to do for the country” (524).  
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Many of the CEOs who were wondering why Paulson had arranged the meeting quickly realized 
what was happening. Ken Lewis, CEO of Bank of America, was the first executive to voice his 
opinion on why they should all sign. He explained there was “a lot to like and dislike about the 
program,” but if they didn’t have a “healthy fear of the unknown, then [they were] crazy” (526). He 
finished by saying that everyone knew they “were all going to sign” (526). Bernanke immediately 
followed by saying that the country was in the worst financial shape since the Great Depression, 
and asked everyone to look out for the common good. John Mack, head of Morgan Stanley, 
asked for the paper and signed his name. Within 40 minutes, seven out of eight of the other 
CEOs signed on. Within hours, everyone was on-board. 
         The epilogue to Too Big to Fail mentions the impact that TARP had on the American 
economy, and addresses the public discourse concerning the relationship between the 
government and capitalism. By bailing out the major banks, the United States government had 
become a major share-holder of the most important American financial institutions. The public 
was uneasy about this relationship, and Sorkin argues that what emerged was that “traditional 
political beliefs had been turned on their head” (530). President Bush, who signed the TARP bill, 
found himself in the un-Republican position of advocating for government intervention. The TARP 
money was not a panacea for all the country’s financial problems, however. Treasury officials 
referred to Citigroup as “the Death Star,” and the bank received another $20 billion on top of the 
$25 billion that it received in TARP money. Controversy erupted in early 2009 when Bank of 
America required another $20 billion bailout, even though billions of dollars’ worth of the original 
bailout money was used to pay executive bonuses. AIG ultimately ended up with $180 billion from 
the government, with no apparent way to be able to pay the money back. Coincidentally, AIG was 
looking more and more like the subprime homeowners who were unable to pay back their 
mortgages. 
         Sorkin ends his book by discussing whether or not the financial crisis could have been 
avoided. He doesn’t give a definitive answer yes or no, but says that the foundation for the 
financial meltdown had been laid down long before Secretary Paulson took office in 2006. A 
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variety of factors such as “deregulation of the banks in the 1990s... the push to increase 
homeownership... and the system of Wall Street compensation that rewarded short-term risk 
taking” all contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 (534). Sorkin ends with the notion that 
studying the financial crisis is important, but only if that knowledge is used to better the financial 
structures of our economy. If we don’t apply the lessons learned from the financial meltdown, 
then we are doomed to repeat our mistakes. 
         Because Too Big to Fail gives a glimpse into the lives of the public and private sector 
individuals who were directly involved with the crisis and the resulting bailout, it is a good 
resource for us to use. It gives a unique insider perspective on the whole situation and the 
individuals involved. Although our documentary won’t focus on the extremely small details like 
Too Big to Fail does, the book serves an important purpose in highlighting several key things. 
One of the most important things to take away from Too Big to Fail is that the bailout may have 
prevented a catastrophic meltdown of our financial system. This is an interesting issue, because 
of the opposition by many to the very thought of government bailouts. However, Too Big to Fail 
frames the government intervention as a type of necessary evil. This then raises the question of 
what exactly the future of the government’s role is in regulating the markets. How will the 
government make sure that something like this never happens again? The relationship between 
the government and the markets is something that will be important for us to explore in our film, 
and Too Big to Fail provides a thought-provoking framework to work from. 
 
Film Review 
 Since the financial crisis of 2008, there have been several documentaries produced 
about the subject—most notably Inside Job (8 October 2010), which won the award for Best 
Documentary Feature at the 2011 Oscars. In 2009, Michael Moore came out with Capitalism: A 
Love Story (2 October 2009), and the PBS series Frontline produced a piece on the financial 
crisis titled “Inside the Meltdown” (17 February 2009). These films focus on the main players 
involved in the recession, and the factors that led to an economic downturn. Several other 
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documentaries were produced and released prior to (or right around) the financial crisis. 
I.O.U.S.A. (14 November 2008), Maxed Out (10 March 2006), and Enron: The Smartest Guys in 
the Room (22 April 2005) deal with issues of predatory lending, shady business practices, and 
notions of corporate greed. These films are interesting in the regard that they preceded the 2008 
economic downturn and that they foresaw certain elements of the eventual recession. In this film 
review, I will discuss some of these films and hash-out the major themes, topics, and modes of 
presentation of each respective film. 
Produced and released before the financial crisis hit in 2008, Maxed Out focuses on the 
credit card industry and issues of predatory lending. Maxed Out might not focus on the financial 
crisis, but many of the issues that it brings up are entirely interrelated to the crisis. In many ways 
the film foreshadowed the economic downturn; it highlights the abusive and predatory practices of 
credit card companies, and reveals an unsettling eagerness of debt buyers to purchase up debt 
from creditors. The overall theme of the movie revolves around the idea that the United States 
has become a country of debt, and financial institutions are willing to exploit that for their own 
financial gain. While Maxed Out concerns itself with the credit card industry, this documentary 
about predatory lending is entirely analogous to what happened with the real estate market and 
subprime lending in 2008. 
Maxed Out lacks a narrative through-line, and instead compartmentalizes various topics 
of discussion about the credit card industry throughout the film. It most resembles an expository 
documentary. However, it lacks the narration that is usually present in other expository films. 
Maxed Out, instead, grounds itself in interview sequences that reveal personal and emotional 
stories of those who have been wrecked by credit card debt. In one interview sequence, two 
women—Trisha and Janne—recount stories of how their children left for college and accrued 
massive credit card debts. Janne explains that her son at one point had 12 credit cards. It is 
eventually revealed that Trisha’s daughter and Janne’s son both committed suicide over the debt 
they had individually accumulated. While Maxed Out offers a biting indictment of the credit card 
industry, the film works effectively in focusing on these sorts of personal narratives. In this sense, 
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I feel that Maxed Out most resembles the documentary we are setting out to make about the 
financial crisis. It covers the issue of credit card industry abuses in a serious tone, it offers a 
comprehensive look at the issue of lending and debt, but more importantly, it addresses 
significantly the “human element” of those affected by credit card debt. 
Visually, Maxed Out relies primarily on self-shot footage. There is some use of archival 
and news footage, but the majority of the film is composed of self-shot interview footage. 
Although there is more of a reliance on talking head interviews in this film, it works well; the 
interview subjects seem to function more as storytellers, and the visual form of these interview 
sequences seems to aid the storytelling aspect of the film. During the interview sequences with 
people who have dealt with debt, there is a closeness between the camera and the subject (either 
through close camera placement or a zoom). This has the effect of creating an emotional 
closeness to the person being interviewed. However, of all the films covered in this literature 
review, Maxed Out is the least visually engaging. 
Frontline’s episode entitled “Inside the Meltdown” was produced immediately after the 
markets tanked in September 2008 (and aired in February 2009). "Inside the Meltdown" takes a 
much more journalistic and emotionally restrained approach to covering the financial crisis than 
what is seen in Maxed Out, and it has a drastically different effect on the audience. The episode 
is produced and framed similarly to other episodes of Frontline. Stylistically, it is a straight 
expository documentary, complete with narration, interviews, and other rhetorical elements. It 
starts by chronicling the alarming rise in home foreclosures in early 2008, and how there were 
worries that dropping home values would negatively affect the financial services industry as a 
whole. “Inside the Meltdown” follows the eventual fallout from the burst of the housing bubble, 
and documents the crash of Bear Stearns, AIG, and addresses how the housing bubble was 
really the catalyst for the breakdown of our economy. 
Sit-down interviews are typically conducted with journalists (i.e. Gretchen Morgenson and 
Charles Duhigg of The New York Times) and academics (i.e. economists Mark Gertler and Paul 
Krugman), but the film features less speaking time with those involved in the financial services 
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industry. Naturally, this leads to a less confrontational documentary style. This episode of 
Frontline steers away from being too controversial or confrontational by reporting facts from a 
neutral point of view. Although this type of documentary filmmaking tends to be less emotionally 
charged, it is still intellectually engaging and thought provoking. 
Visually, “Inside the Meltdown” relies primarily on the use of self-produced interview and 
b-roll footage. Sometimes black and white photographs are used with the “Ken Burns effect,” but 
this footage was most likely paid for. The “Ken Burns effect” is a technique of slowly panning 
across a still photograph, and it works nicely in "Inside the Meltdown." It allows for otherwise 
stationary visuals to have motion and a sense of visual fluidity, which is appealing to the eye. In 
this episode of Frontline, the "Ken Burns effect" is used with black and white photos of high-
ranking politicians and financial services executives, and almost adds to a noir-like atmosphere. 
By intertwining suspenseful interviews with this type of imagery, the film exudes a gravitas and 
seriousness that is unsettling and disconcerting. The visuals, ominous music, and subject matter 
(of an all-out collapse of our economy) convey a sense of impending doom that is almost 
apocalyptic.  For our project, it will be important for the team to keep these styles of cinematic 
approach in mind. We need to be mindful that there has to be an emotional hook to the story, and 
that it can even be enhanced through simple filmic devices like music. But we also need to show 
restraint and not be melodramatic with the material. 
Michael Moore’s film Capitalism: A Love Story was released about a year after the crisis 
hit, and the film argues that unregulated and unrestrained capitalism played an inherent role in 
the eventual downturn of the economy. While Capitalism: A Love Story covers a wide variety of 
pitfalls related to capitalism (corporate greed, its direct conflict with religious values, etc.), a 
significant portion (mostly the second half of the film) deals specifically with the financial crisis. 
The first point that Moore makes about the crisis is that subprime lending (and predatory 
lending in general) was the driving impetus of the disaster. In dealing with the topic of the 
subprime market, Moore addresses and pays special attention to the humanistic and emotional 
parts of the story. On three different occasions in the film, families are shown being evicted from 
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their homes after being foreclosed on. The use of dramatic music also plays into these emotional 
elements. When describing the September 2008 market crash as analogous to a dam bursting, a 
foreboding instrumental soundtrack suggests an emotional tone that would be subdued 
otherwise. I find this use of music to be appropriate and effective, because it is used in a way that 
complements the material. It isn’t distracting, and it isn’t used as a cheap device to evoke 
emotions that would otherwise be completely absent without the music.  
Moore then links subprime lending to notions of corporate greed and unethical behavior. 
He argues and explains that some of the CEOs and higher-ups of major financial institutions were 
made rich by engaging in risky subprime lending, and that such lending was lucrative exactly 
because of the higher interest rates involved. The selling of toxic assets was rampant, and the 
short-sightedness of making quick money in the subprime market undoubtedly played a crucial 
role in the eventual collapse of the market; when home foreclosures reached a new high in 
September 2008, it had a domino effect on the rest of the financial services industry. Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Washington Mutual were hit especially hard, eventually 
going out of business, with many other banks, brokerages, and insurance companies suffering 
major losses. Again, Moore relates all of these events as being entirely symptomatic of 
capitalism. 
 Capitalism: A Love Story is stylistically a much different film than “Inside the Meltdown.” 
The film follows the same formula and style of Moore’s other confrontational documentaries, and 
is heavily influenced by the expository, participatory, and performative modes of documentary 
filmmaking. Consequently, Moore injects himself into Capitalism in interesting and funny ways. In 
one sequence, he goes to all of the major banks on Wall Street with an empty cash bag, 
attempting to get the money back that they received in the 2008 bailout. While some find this 
signature Moore-style approach to filmmaking unappealing, it does yield funny and sometimes 
unexpected results. When a doorman at Goldman Sachs prevents Moore from entering the 
building, Moore gestures towards the door and asks, “what would happen if I made a run for it 
right now?” The doorman pauses, shoots him a glare, and shrugs his shoulders and arms as if to 
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sarcastically say, “I don’t know.” This sort of comedy is essential in Capitalism and helps lighten 
the mood in contrast to the more dramatic and depressing content. This is effective and important 
in Michael Moore’s films because it keeps the audience emotionally engaged. 
Visually, the film is very interesting. Moore deftly weaves archival footage, interviews, and 
C-Span footage to punctuate his arguments against unbridled capitalism. However, in my opinion, 
the most creative use of visuals in this film is the use of 1950s and ‘60s film footage. Moore uses 
these visuals in a variety of creative and interesting ways. When explaining that the top tax 
bracket used to pay taxes on 90% of their income, Moore shows us retro footage of dams, 
bridges, schools, interstate highways, hospitals, and the moon landing—explaining that all of 
these things were created through taxation of the wealthiest Americans. Moore explains that 
families used to be able to live off the pay-check of one bread-winner, job security was better, 
high school students could go to college without having to take out loans, most families had 
savings accounts, and that there was a strong middle class in general. All while making these 
points, we are presented with “wholesome” 1950s imagery—a mother walking down the aisle of 
grocery store, men working on an assembly line, a couple water-skiing, a mother and father 
attending their child’s graduation, a family on a rollercoaster. Ultimately, these retro visuals help 
create a nostalgia for the way things used to be, and helps bolster Moore’s point that financial 
deregulation and Reagan-era tax code changes destroyed the middle class. This ‘50s film 
footage re-appears throughout Capitalism and serves a variety of purposes: comedic tone, 
emotional effect, and even to help advance the plot, but its use is visually interesting and adds 
variety to the film. These visual devices are something to keep in mind as we go forward with our 
project, because it will benefit us to think of ways that will keep our audience interested in what 
they are seeing. I don’t know if our project will use anything similar to ‘50s footage, but the point is 
that visual cues can add a lot of depth to what is being said in a film. 
Inside Job was released a year and a half ago, and functions as an expository 
documentary that highlights the faulty systemic policies within the financial services industry that 
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eventually led to the 2008 crisis. Matt Damon narrates the film, helping to explain the essential 
plotline of the economic downturn. 
Because Inside Job primarily focuses on the recession of the U.S. economy, the 
beginning of the film comes as a surprise, yet helps contextualize the American experience of the 
crisis. The film begins with a prologue that describes the complete economic depression currently 
being experienced in Iceland which was caused by extreme government deregulation and 
privatization of major financial institutions. The narrative of Iceland is then paralleled and 
compared with the current situation of the United States economy, and serves as a cautionary 
tale that America may be headed down the same road of economic despair. This prologue intro 
lasts only five minutes, but functions as an important hook for the audience.  It creates a tangible 
sense of impending danger for the United Sates and Americans, acting as a figurative “wake-up 
call” that suggests more policy changes are needed in the financial services industry. 
After the prologue, the film addresses the news that broke on September 15th, 2008—
that Lehman Brothers had declared bankruptcy, and that the world’s largest insurance company, 
AIG, had collapsed. Through the inter-cutting between narration and interviews with academics, 
business professionals, CEOs, and politicians, Inside Job not only lays out how the collapse of 
the markets in 2008 affected individuals, but how the downturn happened as the inevitable result 
of “an out of control industry.” The film from here is organized into 5 major chapters: 1) How We 
Got Here, 2) The Bubble, 3) The Crisis, 4) Accountability, and 5) Where We Are Now. 
Stylistically, Inside Job is a very confrontational documentary. In this sense, it is also a 
very participatory documentary. Charles Ferguson, the director of the film, is unabashed in his 
interviewing style and unafraid to ask controversial—sometimes inflammatory—questions. 
Because he is so involved with the social actors in his films, it does become a very participatory 
documentary. For example, when interviewing Scott Talbott, the chief lobbyist for the Financial  
Services Roundtable, Ferguson asks, “are you comfortable with the fact that several of your 
member companies have engaged in large-scale criminal activity?” 
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Inside Job has an engaging visual style. It makes use of a 2.35:1 aspect ratio, which is 
something rather unconventional for documentaries. This gives the film a very cinematic look, and 
makes the framing of interview scenes interesting from a compositional standpoint. Typically, 
interview subjects will occupy 1/3 of the screen, and are alternated left/right. This is done to 
visually engage the viewer and keep their eyes moving, but it also has the effect of creating an 
emotional distance between the viewer and the unlikable interview subjects. Avoiding excessive 
talking head interviews, Inside Job makes extensive use of animations, charts, scanned 
documents, pictures, news clips, and other archival footage to anchor the interviews and 
narration in ways that helps the audience grasp what’s being talked about; these visual 
components are not only visually interesting, but informational and emotionally engaging. For 
example, when the narrator is talking about the Glass-Stegall act and the merger of Citi and 
Travelers Group, we are visually shown a congressional law book that contains the details of the 
bill. 
 
Proposed Content Structure of Financial Crisis Documentary 
When the team was told that we would have $50,000 for our budget, we originally wanted 
to produce a feature length film. But, when we found out that we didn’t have the money, we had 
to scale back various aspects of the project, including the running time. The documentary will now 
be a short. Ideally, we would like to make something around 30 minutes long.  
 The film will divided into three acts. The first act will function mostly as an informative 
piece that will explain the basics of how the financial crisis happened. It will discuss the subprime 
market, predatory lending, securitization, the major players involved, and the government bailout 
of the financial services industry. Some of this information can be somewhat esoteric and 
confusing, but with the aid of animated visuals, we believe that the viewer will gain a much better 
understanding of the background to the crisis. Because some of this information can be 
somewhat abstract, we want to start the film with an emotional hook that can ground the crisis in 
something relatable. Whether it’s a brief vignette of someone being foreclosed on, losing their job, 
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or trying to find employment, we believe that a personal story like this can help reel the audience 
in. 
            The second act will introduce other human interest stories as well as interviews with 
government officials, businessmen, employees of small banks and credit unions, educators, and 
other individuals who work in the financial services industry. The goal of this section is to show 
exactly who was affected by the financial crisis, and how they were affected.  
            The third act will then cover how individuals and businesses are coping with the crisis, 
and what they plan to do for the future. This section will provide recommendations from interview 
subjects about how to move forward and ensure that we do not see another financial crisis. 
 
Filming Process/Visual Style 
            Although there is significant overlap in the assigned roles for this project, I will act 
primarily as the director of photography. Johnny has taken on the role of director and Will will be 
our chief editor. Burke Stuart from Daniels College will help with some of the shoots.  
Through funding from Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences (AHSS), the Media, Film & 
Journalism Studies department was able to purchase two Panasonic AF100 video cameras. After 
doing research, we came to the conclusion that these cameras offer the best image quality for 
their price range. Because of the AF100’s 4/3” CMOS imaging censor, the camera lends itself 
very well to shallow depth of field shooting. This technology replicates the same visual style of 
film, and because of that, there will be a visual professionalism to the content that we shoot. This 
is important to me because student productions tend to have rather amateurish production 
values, and I don’t want this to feel like a “student film.” 
Along with the cameras, AHSS also provided funding for two 14-140mm lenses that will 
be an integral part of our shooting. These lenses allow for tight, close-up shots when completely 
zoomed in, and the effect is rather beautiful from an aesthetic standpoint. When zoomed in, the 
focal plane becomes very small, creating an even shallower depth of field than the camera 
naturally provides, and this will lend itself to a filmic (rather than video) visual style. When zoomed 
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out, these lenses allow for nice, wide shots that will help in cases where we need establishing 
shots/visuals. The ability to have these wide shots will aid our ability to define the space and 
environment that we are shooting in.  
The use of two cameras (instead of just one) will serve two important functions: there will 
always a backup camera (and footage) if one malfunctions or if there is a camera-operator error, 
as well as allow for dynamically shot interviews. While one camera records a wide shot, the other 
will be used for close-ups that can be cut to in the editing process. We feel that the variation 
between these wide and tight shots will keep the audience visually interested in what they are 
seeing. 
 Our film will contain other sequences that are not necessarily interview-based, and need 
consideration in terms of visual style. With some of our human-interest stories, we feel that a 
handheld vérité style will work best in conveying a tone that feels more “real.” One of our 
prospective subjects is being helped by the Denver Rescue Mission in finding low-income 
housing, and in terms of aesthetics it will be visually much more interesting to use a handheld 
technique to record them as they move into their new home. Not only does it make sense 
aesthetically to shoot handheld in these situations, it’s much easier to record these real life 
moments on-the-fly without having to worry about a tripod. Because sit-down interviews are in a 
controlled environment, there is a higher expectation to make sure lighting, camera positioning, 
etc. are the best they can be. But, the in-the-moment handheld vérité style naturally has a grittier 
feel that doesn’t feel so “perfect.” That is not to say that the fundamentals of good filmmaking go 
out the window with this style, but there is an understanding that the visuals might not be as 
refined. Ultimately, this type of shooting style adds to the charm of what’s being shot, as long as 
it’s used appropriately. Within the context of the financial crisis, this visual approach is desirable 







 Post-production and editing will be done on Will’s Mac Pro as well as computers at the 
Media, Film, & Journalism Studies building. Because we want to use an animated sequence to 
aid the explanation of the financial crisis in our first act, we will need animators to help with that 
aspect of our project. Although communication with the Digital Media Studies department has 
been somewhat shaky, we hope to secure a DMS student to do this animation. 
 
Marketing and Distribution 
            Our primary target audience is college educated 18-34 year-olds. We believe that this 
audience possesses an instinctive interest in the financial crisis. The crisis is something that 
affects our generation rather profoundly, and we think that our documentary would appeal to this 
age group the most. Our hope is that we can inform our audience enough that they feel 
compelled to do something. If we can inspire people to at least talk about the issues, I would feel 
extremely satisfied with my work. It would be an amazing feat if our film influenced somebody 
enough to actually confront the problem in a bigger way, but I think one of our primary goals is to 
just get a dialogue started (especially within the younger demographic). Our secondary target 
audience is older, extending up to 65 years of age. We believe that people up to this age group 
who have a general interest in documentaries will enjoy this film.  
 We will want to market the documentary to our target audience within the Colorado area. 
The film will be marketed to University of Denver students, Colorado residents, business school 
students, those who have been affected by the crisis, and future professionals working in finance, 
banking, education, and public policy. Although our revised budget does not allow for the same 
marketing and distribution as originally planned, we still want to pursue larger outlets to make our 
film known and available. The primary way to get our film noticed on a larger scale is to send it to 
film festivals, approach local television networks and academic institutions, and to advertise and 








Chapter Two: Production 
 
 Although the majority of filming did not happen until summer (months later), the crew 
conducted its first on-camera interview in January 2011. The interview was as much of an attempt 
to understand that financial crisis as it was a test-run for our project. At this point, the crew was 
still working in coordination with the Daniels College of Business and we did not have the 
Panasonic AF-100 cameras that we would later have. The crew used two rented Panasonics from 
the Department of Media, Film & Journalism Studies, and a Canon 5D DSLR owned by Will. We 
also rented some lights and tested a two-point lighting method. For the test interview, Xander 
Page (of Daniels College) asked Dr. John Holcomb (Professor of Business Ethics and Legal 
Studies) questions about the genesis of the financial crisis, and the various factors that led to the 
downturn in the economy. Upon review of the footage that we shot, we were rather unimpressed 
with how some of the footage looked. The Panasonic footage looked extremely flat and dull. 
Colors were muted and the dynamic range of the image was unimpressive. The footage from 
Will’s Canon DSLR, however, looked great. The image was saturated with rich colors, the 
contrast looked nice, and the inherent shallow depth-of-field provided by the camera created a 
very cinematic-like image. This footage is included in the final cut of the film. The only problem I 
have with it is that it was shot at 24 frames per second (fps). Months after this shoot—when the 
crew received the AF-100 cameras to shoot the documentary on—we decided to continue filming 
with a frame rate of 30fps for technical reasons. While most people probably won’t be able to tell 
the difference between the 24fps and 30fps footage within the film, there is a subtle difference 
between the two; the cadence and rhythm is just slightly different. 
 The content of the interview ended up informing our broader understanding of the crisis. 
John explained the crisis as a linear narrative, discussing the various factors that led to the 
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financial downturn. At this point, the crew had not done much research, so the things that John 
talked about were very enlightening. He detailed the socio-political context of the crisis and 
helped us to understand the housing bubble (which infected other parts of the financial services 
industry) and the types of investments that ended up tanking the economy. This footage will help 
our audience understand the crisis, as well.  
 The next significant shoot happened in March when the crew decided to go to the 16th 
Street Mall in downtown Denver. We decided that it would be a good idea to get “man-on-the-
street” interviews. By asking the general public a few questions, we figured we could get a pulse 
on what average Americans think about the crisis, as well as get our own thoughts rolling about 
the project. The task of finding individuals willing to go in front of the camera proved difficult. 
Johnny stood on the sidewalk on one side of the street, while I stood on the sidewalk opposite of 
him. As people walked by, we asked individuals if they would talk to us about the financial crisis. 
Johnny tried his hardest to wrangle in anybody who would be interested in talking to us. But 
ultimately, I don’t think he was able to get a single person to go in front of the camera. I’m 
convinced it’s because of the production notebook he was holding. In my experience, if a person 
on the street tries soliciting your attention (and they’re holding a notebook), it means they’re from 
Green Peace, or Environment Colorado, or some other advocacy group like that. Those people 
tend to get ignored—a lot. So, it’s no surprise that Johnny had difficulty in finding someone to 
speak with.  
I, on the other hand, had an easier time. In fact, I think everybody who went in front of the 
camera that day was convinced to do so by me. But, then again, I didn’t have a notebook. 
However, my success of bringing a few people to talk with us on-camera didn’t diminish the fact 
that it was still an extremely difficult task. A good portion of people we approached or tried talking 
to just flat-out ignored us. Some were even rude. I remember asking a man if he wanted to “talk 
to me on-camera about the financial crisis.” As he continued walking by me, he sarcastically told 
me “good luck with that.” From what Johnny told me, he had an even rougher time with people 
ignoring him and being snarky. This was a somewhat ominous sign for me. I immediately began 
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thinking about the future difficulties we would probably face in securing interview subjects to talk 
to. 
When we realized (almost immediately) that it was going to be difficult to get people to go 
on-camera, Johnny and I began modifying our “pitch.” We realized that we had to—in very few 
words—get the attention of passersby and compel them to want to talk with us. Instead of asking 
people if they wanted to “be in a documentary about the financial crisis,” we began invoking the 
fact that we were graduate students who needed help with their thesis project. For me, this 
seemed to work better at capturing the immediate attention of individuals who happened to be 
walking by. However, once I had people reeled in, I ended up losing a lot of them. When we told 
them that we were shooting a documentary and needed on-camera interviews, they immediately 
became shy and reluctant to work with us. On top of that, when they were told that it was a 
documentary about the financial crisis, the default position seemed to be, “oh, I don’t know 
anything about that.” I tried to coax as many reluctant individuals as possible into talking with us, 
but the combination of camera-shyness and unfamiliarity with the subject matter caused a lot of 
potential interviewees to walk away. I even tried to comfort some individuals by telling them that it 
didn’t matter if they didn’t know anything about the crisis—that we just wanted to talk honestly 
with everyday people about their perceptions of the economic downturn. 
 The people that did agree to go in front of the camera were certainly not representative of 
the whole. These people tended to have bolder personalities and were not as reluctant to talk 
with us. Most of them also had an above-average understanding of the financial crisis, and were 
thus more comfortable to discuss the subject. I filmed the interviewees using my Panasonic HMC-
150, while Will operated the boom pole, and Johnny asked the questions.  
 The shoot on the 16th Street Mall presented the crew with a technical issue that seemed 
to haunt us throughout the entire production of the documentary: how to effectively use natural 
lighting outdoors. Most of the interview footage from 16th Street Mall looks great, but towards the 
tail end of our interviews, clouds began obscuring the natural sunlight we were using. A weather 
front from the west was pushing clouds in and out of the way of our usable sunlight, and as a 
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result, I had to constantly rock the iris back and forth to maintain a properly exposed image during 
the last interviews we conducted. From fairly early on the group took the position that we should 
shoot most of our interview sequences outside, as to avoid the “stuffy” Inside Job aesthetic of 
shooting inside. However, the decision to do this came at a price. Although shooting outside 
provided us with slightly more interesting visuals during interviews, we sacrificed the controllable 
nature of indoor lighting and shooting. Our next shoot with former Wall Street investor Mike 
Krieger also suffered from the unpredictability of using natural lighting.  
 In June, we met with Mike in Boulder and conducted an interview on the rooftop of the 
University of Colorado student center. Having lived in Boulder for four years, I suggested the 
shooting location because of the beautiful mountain views that it provides. We had Mike sit at a 
table across from Johnny, with me operating the primary camera. I framed Mike and Johnny in a 
wide shot, with Boulder’s iconic Flatiron rock structures in the background. At times, I would 
zoom-in and get a close-up of Mike while he was talking. Will operated the second camera, which 
was dedicated to close-ups of Mike and reaction shots of Johnny. Sound was recorded by hiding 
microphones underneath the meshed wire of the table Johnny and Mike were sitting at. This was 
the first time we used the AF-100 cameras which were purchased for the project, and we were 
really excited to try out the new equipment. 
 I was satisfied with the footage we got from the interview, but there were a few things that 
bothered me upon review. The first glaring mistake was an out-of-focus shot that I was 
responsible for. Fortunately, I realized this mistake during the shoot, and eventually corrected the 
focus. But, this incident rendered the footage somewhat unusable. It also made the crew realize 
the downside of using a 14 to 140mm zoom lens. Because the lens has such a dynamic zoom, it 
causes the focus to be extremely sensitive. The focal plane of the lens is extremely shallow, and 
a small nudge to the focus ring can cause an in-focus shot to go extremely out-of-focus. I think 
this is exactly what happened when interviewing Mike. The second thing I noticed about the 
interview footage with Mike was, as mentioned before, problems with sunlight. We began the 
interview in the late morning, and by the time the interview was over, it was early afternoon, and 
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the direction of the sun had changed pretty dramatically. At the beginning of the interview, Mike 
was lit by the sun from the side, and I personally think it looked great. By the end of the interview, 
however, he was being lit from directly above and slightly behind. This caused a shadow to be 
cast over most of Mike’s face—a rather unappealing shot.  
 About a week later we interviewed Chuck Leone, and we ran into some more problems 
with using natural lighting. We arranged an outdoor interview for early morning (hoping to improve 
on the lighting conditions from Mike’s interview), but we didn’t schedule early enough. If we had 
scheduled the interview for sunrise, we could have used “golden hour” sunlight to our advantage. 
Instead, the harsh sunlight wrecked our ability to maintain a decent exposure across the entire 
image. I was able to expose Chuck’s face decently, but in doing so, I was overexposing hotter 
parts of the frame. In looking through the viewfinder of the camera, I could see that Chuck’s shirt 
was essentially glowing because of how overexposed it was. Reviewing the footage confirmed 
my suspicions of overexposure. 
 This shoot with Chuck taught me a couple important lessons about conducting interviews 
outside. Firstly, that filming outside in the middle of summer results in extremely unpleasant 
lighting. We felt like we learned our lesson from Mike’s interview by scheduling an earlier 
interview with Chuck. And in retrospect, I almost feel like early to mid-morning sunlight is even 
harsher than sunlight that is coming from directly above. Secondly, on that day, temperatures 
were reaching the 90s by the time we started filming, and it caused Will and Chuck to sweat on-
camera. The close-up shot of Chuck reveals beads of sweat on his forehead. Doing the interview 
in such heat undoubtedly has negative effects. It puts the interviewer and interviewee at a 
discomfort, and visually, it’s not necessarily an attractive quality. Personally, I was absolutely 
miserable during the shoot. I do not tolerate extreme heat very well at all, and I was unprepared 
for it during the interview. I decided to wear jeans that day (for some reason) and by the time we 
started filming I was already feeling dehydrated and overheated. I remember sweating and being 
extremely uncomfortable during the interview. As it progressed my clothes started getting 
drenched in my sweat, and I began to feel physically sick from the dehydration. I felt better after 
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the shoot when I could drink some water and get in some air conditioning, but that was a horrible 
experience for me. It was a rough lesson, but at least it taught me to be prepared for the 
elements. Certainly, it taught me to be ready for our shoot at the Colorado State Fair a couple 
months later (where the temperature broke 100 degrees). The harshness of the lighting and heat 
during this interview with Chuck forced the crew to seriously reconsider shooting outdoors.  
 The content that we got from Chuck was very similar to the information that we got from 
John. He mostly provided a background to the crisis, and he also explained that the collapse of 
the economy was very much rooted in the burst of the internet bubble, which happened almost 
ten years previous. He also discussed the Wall Street bailout and expressed his belief that 
capitalism needs to be a Darwinian system where the weakest gets weeded out. Chuck’s footage 
is placed prominently in our film, and we feel that he did a good job of talking to us in a clear and 
understandable way that our audience can also understand.  
 I was not present for the interview that Johnny and Will conducted with Senator Alan 
Simpson, due to the fact that I was in the middle of moving from one apartment to another. They 
drove all the way up to Cody, Wyoming to do the interview, and I think they did a great job of 
lighting and shooting the interview themselves. This was the first indoor interview that we did, and 
the lighting was nice and even, and the camera angles were interesting. Johnny did a great job of 
operating two cameras by himself, and the AF-100 proved itself to be a great camera for indoor 
and low-light shooting.  
 We conducted another indoor interview with Larry Harte, the mayor of Glendale, 
Colorado. My friend Shana works on the chamber of commerce with the mayor, and she was able 
to get us an interview with him. Will and I shot the interview together inside of Mayor Harte’s 
office. One thing that was immediately problematic was the fluorescent lighting in his office. We 
brought a few lights with us to shoot the interview, but because incandescent light has a different 
color temperature than fluorescent light, we had to eliminate one of the two sources. We really 
needed as much light as possible (the Mayor’s office is somewhat dark), but the competing color 
temperatures caused there to be conflicting hues and colors within the image, so we shut off the 
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fluorescent lighting and used the lighting kit that that we brought. To compensate for the low light, 
Will and I bumped the gain on the AF-100s to the high setting, and opened up the irises all the 
way. The image was still a tad underexposed, but in my opinion, it looked better than using 
competing fluorescent and incandescent lighting. We setup a boom pole on a C-stand to record 
sound, and I monitored the levels with ear buds through the primary camera (which was a 
stationary wide-shot of the mayor at his desk). While I asked questions from behind the camera 
about how Glendale fared the financial crisis, Will used the secondary camera to shoot some 
handheld, close-up shots of the mayor. I personally think this footage looks a lot better than the 
wide angle that I captured.  
 The interview with Mayor Harte was an interesting experience for me, because it the first 
time in the project that I was asking questions and dealing directly with the interviewee. Although, 
I was behind the camera, instead of on-camera like Johnny and Will (when they interviewed Mike 
and Chuck). This put me much more at-ease. From the beginning of the project, I had expressed 
a lack of interest in being in front of the camera, but asking questions off-screen worked for me. 
Mayor Harte was also a very soft-spoken and gentle interviewee, so it was easy to have a 
conversation with him. The only issue I have with the interview is the dim lighting. 
 Larry doesn’t feature prominently in our film, but he does appear briefly at a few different 
points. The two most important things that he talks about (which made it into the film) are the 
shady practices of mortgage lenders and the effectiveness of government at different levels. As a 
mayor, Larry provides interesting insight about how government is best run at local levels. 
Although this concept is somewhat abstract to the main issues that we talk about in the film, it is 
entirely relevant.   
 Later in August we interviewed “Ranting” Andy Hoffman in Broomfield, Colorado. Before 
we had him go in front of the camera, Will, Johnny, and I scouted an outdoor location near his 
residence. We found a park with a walking path that provided a gorgeous view of the Front 
Range. To vary our shooting, the crew rented out the Steadicam from the department of Media, 
Film & Journalism Studies, and we decided to do a walking-style interview with Andy. Learning 
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our lesson from previous outdoor shoots, we scheduled an interview for sunset (when the light 
would be just right), and when Andy showed up for the shoot, I strapped on the Steadicam body 
harness, and had Will and Johnny help attach the camera. I walked backwards on the path, and 
filmed Johnny as he slowly strolled and conducted his interview with Andy. Will recorded sound 
with a shotgun microphone attached to a pistol grip, and he also had the duty of making sure that 
I wasn’t running into anything as I walked backwards on the path. With one hand, he grabbed a 
part of the Steadicam harness and pulled me in the direction that I needed to be walking. With his 
other hand, he pointed the shotgun microphone at Andy and Johnny as they discussed 
socioeconomic policy. It was an odd configuration for doing an interview, but the footage actually 
turned out pretty nicely.  
The shoot with Andy was another day where the temperature got up to the 90s. Once 
again learning lesson from previous outdoor shoots, I dressed appropriately and made sure I was 
plenty hydrated. The decision to shoot later during the sunset “golden hour” worked to our 
advantage. Unlike the previous interviews, we were able to capture a much softer, diffused light, 
which looked much better than the harsh, mid-day sunlight that we had been shooting in. If I 
could change anything about the interview with Andy, I would have liked to practice with the 
Steadicam a little bit more. There’s definitely an art to working it properly. Also, I would change 
the fact that I threw the iris into the automatic setting on the camera. I just felt like I had so much 
to deal with (having the Steadicam on), that I wasn’t able to handle changing the iris. Because the 
interview was a moving interview (on a twisting footpath), exposures were constantly changing. 
So I decided to let the camera do the work and change the iris automatically. This caused some 
the footage to flicker as the camera struggled to find the right exposure.  
Like Mayor Harte, Andy doesn’t appear much in our film, but he serves an important 
purpose in explaining the flaws of our political system, and how that plays into the crisis. Andy is 
obviously very distrusting of government, but he provides an interesting and bold perspective 
about the state of American socio-politics.  
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Late in August, Will, Johnny, and I headed down to the Colorado State Fair in Pueblo 
with the intention of talking to as many people as possible from various parts of the state. 
Specifically, we wanted to see how people were faring outside of the Denver metro area. It was 
an extremely hot day, and the temperature hit 100 degrees. Conveniently, though, the fair 
organizers gave the three of us press passes, which allowed us access to an air conditioned 
trailer. We were also given a golf cart to get around the grounds easily. This made the heat much 
more bearable. Anytime we started feeling overheated, we could retreat to the trailer and relax for 
a while, and we didn’t have to worry about lugging equipment around by hand.  
The first part of the day in Pueblo involved approaching and talking to farmers, ranchers, 
merchants, and other Colorado workers who were experiencing effects of the downturned 
economy. I shot this footage handheld, while Will recorded sound with a shotgun microphone and 
Johnny asked questions. The second half of the day involved setting up a tripod and asking 
passersby if they wanted to go in front of the camera to talk about the financial crisis. We ran into 
the exact same problem as the 16th Street Mall interviews—nobody seemed to really want to talk 
with us. We were able to talk with some individuals, but like the previous 16th Street interviews, 
the people that went in front of the camera didn’t seem to be representative of a larger whole. The 
Colorado State Fair was an interesting shoot, but it kind of felt like a wasted day in some senses. 
We didn’t think people would be so reluctant to talk with us at the fair, but they were, and we 
didn’t end up with the footage that we wanted to get. We were hoping to find some relevant, 
compelling personal stories about Colorado citizens, but we ended up not getting a whole lot. By 
this point in the project I was feeling rather discouraged that we weren’t finding the human 
interest stories that we originally intended to tell. It was becoming obvious that our project was 
taking on a different angle than we had expected. Instead of being focused on personal 
narratives, our film was looking more and more like a socio-political survey of the factors that led 
to the crisis.  
Possibly the biggest interview we secured as a group was with former Governor Bill 
Ritter. In September, we travelled up to Fort Collins to interview him about the financial crisis and 
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ask how he dealt with the problem as the governor of Colorado. However, there was a quid pro 
quo: we had to film a few things for his green energy initiative before he would give us the 
interview. Although the trade-off was somewhat skewed (he gave us a 10 minute interview for a 
few hours of work), it was worth it. Having the former governor of Colorado in our documentary 
raises our profile and lends a little bit more credibility to the film. We were excited to meet him 
and do the interview, but it was a somewhat stressful shoot. We had been lugging equipment 
around all day doing work for Governor Ritter’s green energy initiative, and when we finally got 
around to doing the interview with him, we were being rushed. We didn’t really have a choice of 
venue for the interview (on the CSU campus), and we were basically tossed into a random office 
by one of his handlers and told that we only had a few minutes to set up until the Governor 
arrived. Will, Johnny, and I scrambled to get lights set up, the cameras white balanced, and the 
sound equipment ready to go. We were rearranging furniture in this small, awkward office, trying 
to make the best of what we were given. If we had had more control over the interview, the 
footage with Ritter would look a lot better than it does. We would have never shot in that office, 
and we would have spent more time trying to get lights set up right. Instead, the footage we have 
has Ritter up against a dull, white wall, and he’s casting a pretty nasty looking shadow. However, 
we feel like a lot of that was out of our hands. The Governor keeps an extremely tight schedule 
and he’s constantly going to and from different places. We are lucky that we even got an 
interview at all.  
In terms of content, Governor Ritter provided us with some background of the crisis. He 
talked about the housing market, subprime mortgages, and how those things directly fed into the 
financial crisis. Like Mayor Harte, Governor Ritter also stressed the importance of being able to 
run government from a more local level. One of the most important moments of Ritter’s interview 
was when he compared subprime lending to trading fragile goods on a railroad. I feel that this will 
be his most important part of the film. Even if the audience doesn’t fully comprehend subprime 
lending, they’ll be able to grasp the concept that subprime lending was one of the main reasons 
why the crisis happened. 
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Possibly my favorite part of the entire production process was filming the Occupy Denver 
protests. By mid-October, the stand-off between protesters and police was reaching its height at 
Civic Center Park. It was coincidental that the Occupy movement came about when it did, but it 
emerged as we were wrapping up the bulk of our production. Will and Johnny each came out with 
me once to help record sound and I spent quite a few days down there by myself. When I made 
solo trips to the protests, I just mounted a shotgun microphone to the camera and recorded sound 
that way.  
The protests were entirely relevant to what we had been working on for the past year, so 
I made a good effort to go downtown to document the happenings. I also got a lot of people to 
talk on camera with me about why they were there. This was far different from the 16th Street 
Mall interviews and the Colorado State Fair interviews. People were passionate and more than 
willing to talk about the financial crisis and the state of the economy. Ultimately, I felt like people 
were joining the protests for a wide variety of reasons, but there was tremendous overlap with the 
values that were emerging in our documentary. At this point during production, we had heard a lot 
from our interview subjects about waste, fraud, and abuse perpetrated by the corporate sector 
and the federal government—something the Occupy movement is fiercely opposed to. 
Additionally, our documentary shares Occupy’s sentiment that there’s a serious lack of corporate 
and government accountability.  
I ended up with hours of protest footage, and if I could have had my way, I would have 
changed the entire focus of the documentary towards the Occupy protests. I just felt like 
something was really happening when I went out with my camera and recorded what was going 
on. Police were clashing with protesters, streets were being occupied and shut down, tents were 
being forcibly removed from Civic Center Park, and I was getting it all on camera. People were 
also giving me great interviews. By this time in our production, we knew that we didn’t have much 
of the “human element” that we originally intended to capture for our documentary, and I was 
excited to film something different from the talking head interviews that we had been doing. (In 
the next section titled “Addressing the Human Element,” I will detail how our project changed over 
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time and how it became much less about the individuals affected by the crisis and more about the 
socioeconomic policies that led to the crash in 2008). I will probably be making a different short 
film out of the hours of Occupy footage that I recorded. 
The last shoot that I did for the project happened during the first week of February. The 
footage, however, will not be present in the current cut of the film. It will most likely be added to 
the cut for later submissions to film festivals. We had struggled to find personal stories related to 
the crisis, and Professor Sheila Schroeder of the Department of Media, Film & Journalism Studies 
presented the crew with a last-minute opportunity to capture a human interest story through her 
connections with the Colorado Progressive Coalition (CPC). She got us in touch with the 
organization, and we felt like it was an opportunity that we shouldn’t pass up, despite happening 
so late. Through the CPC, I was introduced to a man named Leonard.  
Leonard has an extremely interesting story to tell. Leonard is disabled, an Air Force 
veteran, divorced, a foster parent to two teenage boys, and constantly worried that he will be 
foreclosed on. I was able to meet up with Leonard to have him tell his story on-camera. His story 
essentially begins in 2005 when he became sick and required antibiotics. The antibiotics had a 
severe side effect that destroyed the ligaments and tendons in his knees, and he became 
confined to a wheel chair. Unable to comfortably live in the two-story house that he was in, 
Leonard was forced to move into a ranch-style house where he would be able to get around 
easier. He was duped into a bogus mortgage, and he now struggles to make payments on the 
new place. Things have been especially rough for him ever since the mortgage crisis hit, and 
every time he has applied for a loan re-modification, the lending company comes back to him with 
a higher monthly payment that he’s required to make. At his house, he showed me stacks and 
stacks of boxes piled in his garage, telling me, “this is what uncertainty looks like.” Leonard is 
ready to move in the event that he’s foreclosed on. I’m somewhat upset that this footage won’t be 
in the current cut of the film, but once we add his footage to future cuts, his story will add much 
more dimension to our documentary. I recorded the Leonard footage by myself, and it has a 
handheld, vérité style.  
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Addressing the Human Element 
 As mentioned previously, the crew had a difficult time finding personal stories that could 
drive the documentary. What originally began as a project about personal narratives turned into a 
project about socioeconomic politics. Officially, I was in charge of finding the “human element” 
stories, but I kept on hitting brick walls with a lot of my leads. It seemed like a lot of my efforts 
weren’t producing results. Will and Johnny were officially in charge of finding the academic, 
political, and economic types to interview, and it just seemed much easier for them to secure 
those types of contacts. I pursued the Denver Rescue Mission, the Denver Housing Authority, 
Denver Human Services, and the Department of Labor and Employment, but no one ever 
followed through on the help they said they would give us. I routinely took out ads on ULoop (the 
classified ads service for DU) and Craigslist, and I always came up empty-handed with zero 
responses. I regularly asked friends and family if they knew anybody we could interview for the 
project, but again, I kept running into brick walls.  
 I’ve concluded that the subject matter is just too sensitive for most people to talk about if 
they are being negatively affected by the economy. It’s difficult and even embarrassing for 
somebody to go in front of the camera to talk about the ways they are struggling to make it. Not 
everybody wants to expose themselves like that, especially in a documentary. There’s always the 
issue of representation, and many people would be concerned about how they would be 
portrayed. If Johnny and Will had helped out with finding human interest stories, we may have 
been more successful in finding candidates willing to go in front of the camera to tell their story. 
Instead, Will and Johnny’s contacts began piling up, and our original intent to tell human interest 
stories seemed to drift away over time. I feel like I should have spoken up earlier on, because I 
was always much more interested in telling the humanistic side of the financial crisis and we were 
really starting to head in a different direction. If we had all been focused on telling personal 
narratives, I think we would have ended up with a more unique and engaging film. Although we 
have personal elements popping up in street interviews, footage from Pueblo, Occupy Denver, 
and with Leonard, the documentary lacks a narrative thread that is present from beginning to end.  
37 
 
We even ditched the idea of pursuing a participatory-style documentary, partly because 
our film was lacking other human elements. In my opinion, we didn’t pursue the participatory style 
because there was such little real human interaction with other people on-camera, that there was 
no need to establish ourselves as active characters within the film. Even if we had included 
ourselves in the movie in a more prominent way, we were having a hard time figuring out how we 
would introduce ourselves without it coming off as cheesy.   
38 
 
Budget for Production 
  
Equipment Description # Unit Price Total Price 
    
 
    
 Camera Panasonic AG-AF100 Camcorder 2 $4,373.10 $8,746.20 
  Panasonic VBG6PPK LI-Ion Battery 3 $155.81 $467.43 
  Panasonic PKB -275PV Case for AF100 2 $522.34 $1,044.68 






 Lenses Panasonic - Lumix G Vario HD 14-140mm 2 $735.85 $1,471.70 
  Panasonic - Lumix G Vario 14-45mm 1 $280.34 $280.34 
  Tiffen 62mm Clear Filter 1 $11.98 $11.98 






 Audio Audio-Technica AT875 Shotgun Microphone 2 $197.42 $394.84 
  Rycote Lyre Mount and Pistol Grip 2 $102.72 $205.44 
  Rycote Windscreen 2 $93.55 $187.10 












 Tripod Vinton V3AS-AP2F Vision Tripod System 2 $1,849.47 $3,698.94 
    Equipment Total 
        $18,148.39 
          
 
          
Travel # Trips Destination     Miles Traveled 
      
  2 Boulder, CO      134 
  2 Fort Collins, CO   
 
280 
  1 Thornton, CO   
 
32 
  2 Broomfield, CO   
 
88 
  1 Pueblo, CO   
 
216 
  5 Denver, CO (surrounding area)   
 
50 
  1 Jackson Hole, WY   
 
532 
  1 Cody, WY     617 
        
 
Total Miles Traveled 1,949 
        Avg. mpg 21mpg 
        Avg. Gas Price  $3.42 
      Total Gas Cost 
          $315.55 








Food # Trips Avg. Meals Per Trip Avg. Cost Per Meal Total 
     
 15 3 $15.00 $675.00 
     
Beverage # Interviews # Beverages Per Interview Cost Per Beverage Total  
     
 8 4 $2.00 $64.00 
    Total Food Cost  
    $739.00 
     
    Total Spent 
    $19,203.00 
     
Future Expenditures     
     
Film Festivals # Submissions Avg. Entry Fee Total Festival Cost 
    
 10 $45 $450 
    
Film Premiere Description Rental Price 
   
 Cable Center 
Large PA Package 
Large Speakers w/ Stands 
Overhead HD Projection 
Screen 







 Premiere Total $3325.00 
   
 Total Future $3775.00 
   






Chapter Three: Post-Production 
 
Post-production on the documentary essentially began by transcribing and making notes 
on all the interviews we conducted. We organized various ideas and themes that were emerging 
onto note cards, and once we finished making note cards, we were able to group similar ideas 
and themes together by moving the cards around. We then arranged the groupings of cards in a 
linear fashion, creating a timeline of the financial crisis as it happened from the very beginning. 
The various groupings of cards served as the basis for the individual chapters of the film.   
 After we organized all our thoughts, we began editing the footage together. To me, the 
editing process was somewhat of an alienating experience. More than any other time during 
production, I felt like the project was somewhat out of my hands. I was feeling defeated over the 
fact that I failed to find human interest stories for the film, and because of that, I felt like there was 
a disconnect between me and the project at this point. When I showed up for editing days, I felt 
largely indifferent to the overall structure and progression of the film. Instead, I was more 
concerned with the individual aesthetics of specific scenes, and the pacing of the individual 
chapters. For example, I was more concerned with how we cut between two camera angles than I 
was with the actual content. In a sense, this probably made the editing process go along a little bit 
faster. Having three people in the editing room butting heads can lead to a lot of frustrations and 
roadblocks, and the only time I really spoke up is when I disagreed with the audio/visual 
presentation of the material. Being a somewhat politically liberal individual, I also expressed some 
initial disagreement over the more conservative positions that our interviewees (and thus our film) 
take. I was wary of including some of Senator Alan Simpson’s commentary about social security, 
Medicare, Medicaid, and the AARP, and some of Steve Bosley’s interview was off-putting to me. 
But, I eventually came to terms with some of the more conservative values that some of the 
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people in our film embrace. Because we survey a variety of political opinions, I feel like we aren’t 
pushing a single agenda or specific ideology. Instead, we are presenting a comprehensive look at 
the issue. The inclusion of Occupy Denver footage also makes me feel more at-ease with 
including more conservative political opinions that I don’t necessarily agree with.  
Perhaps my favorite part of the post-production process was teaming up with the music 
school and having freshman CJ Garcia compose a score for the film. Although he wrote and 
recorded several pieces for us, we ultimately only used two of his pieces for the film. The two 
songs appear as the intro and outro. They are minimalist, neo-classical pieces in the style of 
Philip Glass and Steve Reich, and they work well to establish a serious mood for our film. I was 
very satisfied with the work that CJ put in, and I’m glad we found him. 
 We also tried to establish a relationship with Digital Media Studies department to find an 
animator for the project, but no one responded to our requests. Animations would have helped 
explain some of the more confusing and complex aspects of the financial crisis, but ultimately, we 
didn’t know anyone who could do the work. We ended up seeking other visual content that we 
could use in the project as b-roll. We used newspaper headlines from the New York Times and 
Wall Street Journal digital microfilm archives, and we incorporated news footage from various TV 
networks. We also used several political cartoons and clips from an episode of South Park. 
Almost all of the b-roll we have in our film was gathered (and converted into the proper video 
format) by me. The inclusion of political cartoons and South Park, however, presents a legal 
dilemma. We can easily claim fair use on the newspaper and TV news footage, but, the other 
content exists in a legally gray area. We believe that we are acting within our fair use rights to use 
this copyrighted material because the content is used in an educational manner and the work’s 
marketability isn’t negatively affected. And in the case of South Park, we are only using small 
portions of the copyrighted work. In the credits at the end of the film, we have a claim that states 
we are using the above-mentioned copyrighted content under fair use. If we are ever challenged 
and sent a cease-and-desist by a copyright holder, it will be easy to remove the content from our 
film. In no way is the material inherent to making our documentary work.  
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 Although I struggled with the post-production process, I am happy to say I really enjoyed 
working with Johnny and Will on this project. We are friends outside of the project, and we 
naturally get along with each other pretty well. Although there may have been some 
disagreements here and there about the project, I can report that we all treated each other with a 
professional respect and worked through any issues that we had. That being said, I’m not so sure 
I would choose to do a group thesis project if I had to do everything all over again. Will, Johnny, 
and I all tried to exert a certain degree of control over the project, and when everybody is vying 
for control, it’s difficult to create a cohesive product. It’s not like there were serious power 
struggles, but creative control can be a tricky and sensitive thing. One of the biggest downsides to 
working in a group is that it tends to diffuse responsibility. It’s hard for me to argue why or why not 
a certain shot is in the film, or why a sequence is edited a certain way. It becomes difficult to 
rationalize or explain something that another crew member is really responsible for. In many 
respects, I think working as a group shifts focus towards simply moving forward and making 
progress, rather than creating a quality product. Instead of constantly putting up a fight, 
concessions are made for the sake of the group and to move things along. It is through this 
process that individual responsibility becomes lost. And conversely, in some cases, working with 
a group increases a sense of personal responsibility. When you are accountable to other people 
and not just yourself, there’s a pressure to not let others down.  In my experience, I’d say that 
working with a group diminishes creative responsibility, but fosters a responsible work ethic. I 
would work with Johnny and Will again on future projects, but I almost wish that I had used my 








Chapter Four: Conclusions 
 
 It seems like every part of this thesis project was a learning experience, one way or 
another. I think the biggest thing I learned about was group dynamics. I’ve always enjoyed doing 
video work by myself, but being in the position where I have to work with others (over the course 
of a year) has taught me a lot. At times, it’s good to be able to put yourself in situations where you 
are outside your comfort zone, and I feel like I’ve learned a lot about myself in the process. In 
working with a crew, I’ve realized that I’m much more interested in the filming (production) 
process than I am the post-production process (I always thought the opposite to be true), and that 
I have an innate interest in telling personal and emotional stories. I’ve also learned that I really do 
need to speak up more (and earlier on) if I feel like I object to the direction that a project is 
headed. I’ve had this problem of non-assertiveness with previous group experiences, and I need 
to take more risks by putting myself out there. When the documentary started becoming less and 
less about personal narratives, I became more and more concerned, but I really didn’t say 
anything. By the time we got around to editing and assembling footage, I wasn’t as emotionally 
invested in the project as I should have been. I still put in the work and met with the crew to edit 
footage, but I felt like the project was in a different place that I wanted it to be.  
However, ever since finishing the final cut of the film, I’ve taken more pride in the project. 
I think I was getting tired of working on the film and I just wanted a lot of it to be over with, 
especially because it was lacking the human interest stories that I so desperately wanted. But, 
after taking some time to cool off from working on the project, I’m happy with what we have and 
I’m proud of the work that I put in. I think the film is easy to follow, and I’m really excited about the 
Occupy Denver footage that I was able to capture.  
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If had more control over the project, the documentary would be focused more on the 
human interest stories like Occupy Denver (or on the individuals involved with Occupy Denver). In 
general, it was a lot easier to get people in front of the camera at the Occupy protests, and if I 
was afforded more time and creative control, I would have spent more time with the protestors 
because some of them gave me outstanding interviews. I was always more interested in this 
humanistic aspect of the crisis and the individuals who were affected, and if I had ultimate control 
of the project, I would focus specifically on Occupy Denver and how it is a direct symptom of the 
financial crisis.  In the current cut of our film, we deal with the crisis in such a broad way that it is 
hard to get a grasp of how the actions of a few ultimately affected a great number of Americans at 
the bottom of the chain. By focusing on individuals, I would be able to convey—on a deeper 
level—just how much the people responsible for the crisis hurt everyday Americans.  
This project was, however, a collaborative effort and we all had an equal say on the 
direction of the film. Because of that group dynamic, it was a lot easier to make progress by 
making certain concessions instead of arguing against everything we disagreed with. By 
admitting to ourselves that we couldn’t possibly reconcile every difference of opinion, we were 
able to move ahead meaningfully with the project.  One area where there were disagreements 
was over the ideological and political content of the individuals we interviewed. Will tended to 
come from a more conservative perspective (agreeing with the more conservative values of those 
we interviewed), and I tended to embrace a more progressive ideology. Johnny sat somewhere 
in-between us. Specifically, Will had reservations about the more liberal Occupy Denver footage, 
and I had reservations about the more conservative opinions expressed by people like Steve 
Bosley. But, by conceding on these points (and leaving the footage in the film), we ended up with 
a stronger documentary. While we might have been wary about including certain content we 
didn’t necessarily agree with, we ultimately realized that including a variety of political and social 
opinions bolstered our film and made it stronger. I think it is clear that our film is more or less a 
survey of differing opinions, and that it is in no way a one-sided argument. I think this makes our 
film stronger, and appeals to a broader audience. 
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 We still have plans to send the film to different festivals, and depending on the length 
requirements of each festival, we may need to cut the film down. The final cut ended up being 40-
minutes, which I think is a good length for the content that we have. We will probably start with 
local festivals first, see if the film gets any traction that way, and gauge our next move from there.  
The end of this thesis marks the end of my graduate school career, and in a way, I’m 
somewhat paralyzed by the thought of finding full-time employment and starting my career. 
However, this thesis has provided me with the opportunity to work in a field that I really enjoy 
working in, and it’s an experience that affirms what I really want to do in life. In any capacity, I 
want to be involved with the filmmaking process. It is such a unique and rich medium, and the 
effect that it can have on people is amazing. The graduate school experience at University of 
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Appendix: Original Proposal 
 
Introduction 
The following proposal lays out the groundwork for a joint project between students of the 
Media, Film and Journalism Studies department and the Daniels College of Business. The 
purpose of the document is to describe various aspects of the filmmaking process and to lay out 
the framework for the vision of the film. The proposal will serve as a working blueprint for the 
successful execution and completion of the film. 
 
Mission 
To create a high quality, documentary film on issues related to the financial crisis and its 
impact on our community.  
 
Vision 
            In September 2008, the face of the financial landscape broke down with such significance 
that the current economic system has been drastically altered. The following events played a key 
role in the economic downturn: 
-Subprime mortgages were issued, grouped into mortgage backed securities  
-Derivatives were deregulated by the government 
-Derivatives are exploited by major lending and financial institutions 
-Housing demand and shifts, as does the ability of the American public to pay off 
mortgages 
-Mass defaults on mortgages make the securities worthless, crash banks and lenders 
-Banks are nationalized to "prevent" all out economic failure 
48 
 
Despite initially stemming from the actions of financial institutions, insurance companies, and their 
leadership, the effects and consequences of the most recent economic downturn have been 
systemic, reaching all areas of American society and pulling global economies into the undertow. 
It is not our intention to point fingers at those responsible, but rather to discover how certain 
individuals have been affected and what we can learn from the stories that have emerged.  We 
intend to explore how have people coped with adversity, how businesses have adapted and 
innovated to pull through, and what role policy will play in correcting the financial setting.  This 
documentary will not propose a solution to future market failures, rather it will serve as a call to 
action for those currently sitting on the sideline, waiting for an upturn. 
            We believe that the story of this crisis lies in the lives of people who have been directly 
impacted by the downturn, but have managed to persevere, innovate, and keep themselves 
together or even excel during these difficult years.  This story should be told through the many 
Americans who fell subject to predatory lending practices, borrowed over their heads, and 
eventually lost their homes.  This story lies in the daily operations of innovative small business 
owners, who despite the credit freeze and inability to secure long-term loans were able to grow 
and succeed. There is an overwhelming number of people who have a direct stake in what has 
happened over the past two years and the question at hand is how do we proceed from here. It is 
our intention to discover how those individuals and entities have acted in response to the crisis, 
and how they plan to move forward from this epoch that tilters between crest and trough. 
            We are not looking for the defibrillator that will resuscitate what may or may not be left of 
the current system. We are looking for how this country - its policies, its businesses, and its 
citizens - has dealt with the adverse circumstance brought about by controlled forces acting within 
a complete construction of its own creation. We stand like millions of others with our hands 
thrown up in frustration. We are only able to ask questions. How did we get here? How do we 
proceed? Can we find success as we move forward? How do we find answers to the questions 
that we have about this crisis?  How are we going to meaningfully engage the current system and 
navigate the waters of the financial structure? 
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            As students, we believe our community can gain insight into society’s future by studying 
not who is to blame or what happened to cause this, but rather who took initiative to succeed.  A 
timeless message inspires people to act and that is the message we intend to convey. 
 
Literature Review 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, there have been several documentaries produced 
about the subject—most notably Inside Job (8 October 2010), which won the award for Best 
Documentary Feature at the most recent Oscars. In 2009, Michael Moore came out with 
Capitalism: A Love Story (October 2, 2009), and the PBS series Frontline produced a piece on 
the financial crisis titled “Inside the Meltdown” (17 February 2009). These films focus on the the 
main players involved in the recession, and the factors that led to an economic downturn. Several 
other documentaries were produced and released prior to (or right around) the financial crisis. 
I.O.U.S.A. (14 November 2008), Maxed Out (10 March 2006), and Enron: The Smartest Guys in 
the Room (22 April 2005) deal with issues of predatory lending, shady business practices, and 
notions of corporate greed. These films are interesting in the regard that they preceded the 2008 
economic downturn and that they foresaw certain elements of the eventual recession. In this 
literature review, I will discuss these films and hash-out the major themes, topics, and modes of 
presentation of each respective film.  
 Inside Job functions as an expository documentary that highlights the faulty systemic 
policies within the financial services industry that eventually led to the 2008 crisis. Matt Damon 
narrates the film, helping to explain the “narrative” of the economic downturn. 
Because Inside Job primarily focuses on the recession of the U.S. economy, the 
beginning film comes as a surprise, yet helps contextualize the American experience of the crisis; 
the film begins with a prologue that describes the complete economic depression currently being 
experienced in Iceland which was caused by extreme government deregulation and privatization 
of major financial institutions. The narrative of Iceland is then paralleled and compared with the 
current situation of the United States economy. This prologue intro—describing Icelandic 
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economic decline and its relation to the United States—lasts only five minutes, but functions as 
an important hook for the audience.  It creates a tangible sense of impending danger for the 
United Sates and Americans, acting as a figurative “wake-up call”  that suggests more policy 
changes are needed in the financial services industry. 
 After the prologue, the film addresses the news that broke on September 15th, 2008—
that Lehman Brothers had declared bankruptcy, and that the world’s largest insurance company, 
AIG, had collapsed. Through the inter-cutting between narration and interviews with academics, 
business professionals, CEOs, and politicians, Inside Job not only lays out how the collapse of 
the markets in 2008 affected individuals, but how the downturn happened as the inevitable result 
of “an out of control industry.” The film from here is organized into 5 major chapters: 1) How We 
Got Here, 2) The Bubble, 3) The Crisis, 4) Accountability, and 5) Where We Are Now. 
 Stylistically, Inside Job is a very confrontational documentary. Charles Ferguson, the 
director of the film, is unabashed in his interviewing style and unafraid to ask controversial—
sometimes inflammatory—questions. When interviewing Scott Talbott, the chief lobbyist for the 
Financial Services Roundtable, Ferguson asks, “are you comfortable with the fact that several of 
your member companies have engaged in large-scale criminal activity?”  
 Inside Job has an engaging visual style. It makes use of a 2.35:1 aspect ratio, which is 
something rather unconventional for documentaries. This gives the film a very cinematic look, and 
makes the framing of interview scenes interesting from a compositional standpoint. Typically, 
interview subjects will occupy ⅓ of the screen, and are alternated left/right. This is done to 
visually engage the viewer and keep their eyes moving, but it also has the effect of creating an 
emotional distance between the viewer and the subject because they occupy such a small portion 
of the frame. When Avoiding excessive “talking head” interviews, Inside Job makes extensive use 
of animations, charts, scanned documents, pictures, news clips, and other archival footage to 
anchor the interviews and narration in ways that helps the audience grasp what’s being talked 
about; these visual components are not only visually interesting, but informationally and 
emotionally engaging. For example, when the narrator is talking about the Glass Stegall act and 
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the merger of Citi and Travellers Group, we are visually shown a congressional lawbook that 
contains the details of the bill.  
 Frontline’s episode entitled “Inside the Meltdown” takes a much more journalistic and 
emotionally restrained approach to covering the financial crisis than what is seen in Inside Job. 
The episode is produced and framed similarly to other episodes of Frontline. It starts by 
chronicling the events of early 2008 that signaled a possible forthcoming disaster. In the spring of 
2008, there was an alarming rise in home foreclosures, and there were worries that dropping 
home values would negatively affect other markets and the financial services industry. Inside the 
Meltdown follows the eventual fallout from the burst of the housing bubble, and documents the 
crash of Bear Stearns, AIG, and addresses how the housing bubble was really the catalyst for the 
breakdown of our economy and financial services industry.  
Sit-down interviews are typically conducted with journalists (i.e. Gretchen Morgenson and 
Charles Duhigg of The New York Times) and academics (i.e. Economists Mark Gertler and Paul 
Krugman), but the film features less speaking time with those involved in the financial services 
industry. Naturally, this leads to a less confrontational documentary style, but in a sense, it 
provides for a tone that is less accusatory and more contemplative. Instead of engaging in an “Us 
vs. Them” attitude and mindset, this episode of Frontline steers away from being too controversial 
or confrontational by reporting facts from a neutral point of view. To compare with Inside Job, for 
example, there’s almost the sense that there’s nobody even behind the camera. Interview 
subjects feel like they are storytellers more than interview subjects, and a person is never heard 
asking any questions to the interview subjects from behind the camera. Inside Job has a lot of 
back-and-forth between director Ferguson and his interview subjects, whereas Frontline is more 
removed. Although this type of documentary filmmaking tends to be less emotionally charged, it is 
still intellectually engaging and thought provoking.  
 Visually, Inside the Meltdown is somewhat different than Inside Job. Although both films 
make use of visual aids, “Inside the Meltdown” is more reserved in its use of secondary footage. 
Instead, there is more reliance on use of self-produced b-roll footage. Sometimes photographs 
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are used with the “Ken Burns effect,” but it is apparent that Frontline does not have the same 
budget of a movie like Inside Job to afford archival footage and other copyrighted material. 
However, this does not work to the detriment of the overall product. By using dramatic music, 
employing “Ken Burns” shots of black and white photos, and by intertwining interesting, 
suspenseful interviews with tasteful b-roll footage of Wall Street and Washington D.C., the final 
product exudes a gravitas and seriousness that is unsettling and disconcerting. An example of 
this is the intro sequence that talks about the emergency meeting on Capitol Hill on 18 
September 2008. These were critical days of the crisis, and the threat of complete financial 
collapse was real. By incorporating news footage with serious music, the piece takes on a 
dramatic tone.  
 While the films mentioned thus far in the literature view have posited that the financial 
crisis was the result of bad financial policy, irresponsible business practices, and corporate greed, 
Michael Moore’s film Capitalism: A Love Story argues that there is a more fundamental issue at 
hand. Moore makes the case that unrestrained capitalism played an inherent role in the eventual 
downturn of the economy. While Capitalism: A Love Story covers a wide variety of pitfalls related 
to capitalism (corporate greed, its direct conflict with religious values, etc.), a significant portion 
(mostly the second half of the film) deals specifically with the financial crisis.  
The first point that Moore makes about the crisis is that subprime lending (and predatory 
lending in general) was the driving impetus of the disaster. In dealing with the topic of the 
subprime market, Moore addresses and pays special attention to the humanistic and emotional 
parts of the story. On three different occasions in the film, families are shown being evicted from 
their homes after being foreclosed on. The use of dramatic music also plays into these emotional 
elements. When describing the September 2008 market crash as analogous to a dam bursting, a 
foreboding instrumental soundtrack suggests an emotional tone that would be absent otherwise.  
Moore then links subprime lending to notions of corporate greed and unethical behavior. 
He argues and explains that some of the CEOs and higher-ups of major financial institutions were 
made rich by engaging in risky subprime lending, and that such lending was lucrative exactly 
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because of the higher interest rates involved. The selling of toxic assets was rampant, and the 
short-sightedness of making quick money in the subprime market undoubtedly played a crucial 
role in the eventual collapse of the market; When home foreclosures reached a new high in 
September 2008, it had a domino effect on the rest of the financial services industry. Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Washington Mutual were hit especially hard, eventually 
going out of business, with many other banks, brokerages, and insurance companies suffering 
major losses. Again, Moore relates all of these events as being entirely symptomatic of 
capitalism. 
Capitalism: A Love Story is stylistically a much different film than Inside Job and Inside 
the Meltdown. The film follows the same formula and style of Moore’s other confrontational 
documentaries, and is heavily influenced by the expository, participatory, and performative modes 
of documentary filmmaking. Consequently, Moore injects himself into Capitalism in interesting 
and funny ways. In one sequence, he goes to all of the major banks on Wall Street with an empty 
cash bag, attempting to get the money back that they received in the 2008 bailout. While some 
find this signature Moore-style approach to filmmaking unappealing, it does yield funny and 
sometimes unexpected results. When a doorman at Goldman Sachs prevents Moore from 
entering the building, Moore gestures towards the door and asks, “what would happen if I made a 
run for it right now?” The doorman pauses, shoots him a glare, and shrugs his shoulders and 
arms as if to say “I don’t know.” This sort of comedy is essential in Capitalism and helps lighten 
the mood in contrast to the more dramatic and depressing content.  
 Visually, the film is very engaging. Moore deftly weaves archival footage, interviews, and 
C-Span footage to punctuate his arguments against capitalism. However, in my opinion, the most 
creative use of visuals in this film is the use of 1950’s footage. Moore uses these visuals in a 
variety of creative and interesting ways. When explaining that the top tax bracket used to pay 
taxes on 90% of their income, Moore shows us retro footage of dams, bridges, schools, interstate 
highways, hospitals, and the moon landing—explaining that all of these things were created 
through taxation of the wealthiest Americans. Moore explains that families used to be able to live 
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off the pay-check of one bread-winner, job security was better, high school students could go to 
college without having to take out loans, most families had savings accounts, and that there was 
a strong middle class in general. All while making these points, we are presented with 
“wholesome” 1950s imagery—a mother walking down the aisle of grocery store, men working on 
an assembly line, a couple water-skiing, a mother and father attending their child’s graduation, a 
family on a rollercoaster. Ultimately, these retro visuals help create a nostalgia for the way things 
used to be, and helps bolster Moore’s point that financial deregulation and Reagan-era tax code 
changes destroyed the middle class. This 50s film footage re-appears throughout Capitalism and 
serves a variety of purposes: comedic tone, emotional effect, and even to help advance the plot, 
but its use is visually interesting and adds variety to the film. These visual devices are something 
to keep in mind as we go forward with our project, because it will benefit us to think of ways that 
will keep our audience interested in what they are seeing. 
 Produced and released before the financial crisis hit in 2008, Maxed Out focuses on the 
credit card industry and issues of predatory lending. Maxed Out might not focus on the financial 
crisis, but many of the issues that it brings up are entirely interrelated to the crisis. In many ways 
the film foreshadowed the economic downturn; it highlights the abusive and predatory practices of 
credit card companies, and reveals an unsettling eagerness of debt buyers to purchase up debt 
from creditors. The overall theme of the movie revolves around the idea that the United States 
has become a country of debt, and financial institutions are willing to exploit that for their own 
financial gain. While Maxed Out concerns itself with the credit card industry, this documentary 
about predatory lending is entirely analogous to what happened with the real estate market and 
subprime lending in 2008.  
 Maxed Out lacks a narrative through-line, and instead compartmentalizes various topics 
of discussion about the credit card industry throughout the film. However, the movie seems 
mostly grounded in the personal and emotional stories about those who have been wrecked by 
credit card debt. In one sequence, two women—Trisha and Janne—recount stories of how their 
children left for college and accrued massive credit card debts. Janne explains that her son at 
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one point had 12 credit cards. It is eventually revealed that Trisha’s daughter and Janne’s son 
both committed suicide over the debt they had individually accumulated. While Maxed Out offers 
a biting indictment of the credit card industry, the film works effectively in focusing on these sorts 
of personal narratives. In this sense, I feel that Maxed Out most resembles the documentary we 
are setting out to make about the financial crisis. It covers the issue of credit card industry abuses 
in a serious tone, it offers a comprehensive look at the issue of lending and debt, but more 
importantly, it addresses significantly the “human element” of those affected by credit card debt. 
 Visually, Maxed Out relies primarily on self-shot footage. There is some use of archival 
and news footage (and coincidentally, the film uses the same type of retro 50s film footage as 
Capitalism: A Love Story, and in the same manner), but the majority of the film is composed of 
self-shot interview footage. Although there is more of a reliance on talking head interviews in this 
film, it works well; the interview subjects seem to function more as story-tellers, and the visual 
form of these interview sequences seems to aid the story-telling aspect of the film. During the 
interview sequences with people who have dealt with debt, there is a closeness between the 
camera and the subject (either through close camera placement or a zoom). This has the effect of 
creating an emotional closeness to the person being interviewed. However, of all the films 
covered in this literature review, Maxed Out is the least visually engaging.  
 In addition to films, much has been written about the financial meltdown of 2008. An 
important book that covers the crisis is Matt Taibbi’s Griftopia. Griftopia is composed of seven 
individual essays that cover different aspects of the crisis, and chapter 3—entitled “Hot Potato”—
provides invaluable insight into the structures that existed that allowed the financial crisis to 
happen. It details—in a very easy to understand vernacular— how the mortgage market was 
being diluted with bad investments, and even how responsible homeowners were duped into 
taking out mortgages that would eventually hurt them.  
In “Hot Potato” Taibbi tells the story of man named Eljon Williams, who meets a self-
described mortgage expert by the name of Solomon Edwards. Williams instantly forms a 
friendship with Edwards, who Williams genuinely believes to be an advocate for underprivileged 
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and low-income homeowners. Edwards eventually helps Williams secure a fixed-rate mortgage 
for a new house, but trouble arises when Williams receives a note from his mortgage owner, 
informing him that the interest on his adjustable rate mortgage has been increased. Believing this 
information to be a mistake (the mortgage is supposed to be fixed-rate), Williams phones 
Edwards to mend the situation. Williams insists that the mortgage promised to him was fixed-rate, 
but Edwards tells him that it was adjustable, and that he had been told that from the beginning. 
Edwards stops answering Williams calls and eventually disappears completely. Williams soon 
realizes that he’s been scammed, and that Edwards had actually made $12,000 by rigging the 
appraisal of the property (it turns out that Edwards was the appraiser). Amidst this whole 
situation, Williams’s wife is diagnosed with ovarian cancer, which causes a great deal of financial 
difficulty for the family.  
In an attempt to work the situation out, Williams contacts America’s Servicing Company 
(the owner of his mortgage). He explains to them his wife’s life-or-death medical situation and the 
deceitful circumstances surrounding the issuance of his mortgage. He pleads with ASC to modify 
their loan, but is ultimately told there is nothing that they can do. Taibbi then goes on to explain 
just how Williamses landed themselves in this situation. It turns out that Edwards falsified the 
Williams’s credit score so that it actually represented a much lower creditworthiness than they 
were actually worth, qualifying them for a subprime loan, when in actuality they would have 
qualified for a regular, fixed loan. By pushing a subprime mortgage, Edwards was able to make 
much more of a commission than if he had given the Williamses a prime loan. Edwards had also 
doctored the loan application so that Clara, Eljon’s wife, appeared to make $7,000 more a month 
than she really earned.  
Taibbi then goes on to explain the exact nature of the relationship between mortgage 
lenders and investment banks to illustrate the larger context of the Williamses situation. The 
mortgage lenders “job” was to create a large number of loans in any way possible, and while this 
might have presented a problem for lenders in the past (they would have not been as likely to 
lend to those who couldn’t pay back their loans), the age of securitization allowed for quick money 
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to be made off of these subprime loans. Instead of making the loans and waiting until they 
reached maturity, securitization allowed for banks to pool various mortgages together, where they 
could then be sold off to other investors as securities. The basic principle behind securitization is 
that it allows for short-term cash to be made off of long-term streams of income. Prior to the 
advent of securitization in the 1970s, money could only be generated and accessed through the 
monthly payments made my homeowners. However, after the invention of securitization, banks 
could take their loans, group them together, and “sell the future revenue streams to another party 
for a big lump sum—instead of making $3 million over thirty years, maybe you make $1.8 million 
up front, today” (84).  
However, it wasn’t just securitization that allowed for outrageous lending practices. 
Lenders were still limited in the sense that they didn’t want to buy mortgages unless they were 
actually good loans and could be paid back. But, with CDOs (collateralized debt obligation), 
banks could generate significant cash-flow. By creating a tiered system in which pooled 
mortgages were rated, shares of mortgages could then be sold to outside investors. CDOs work 
by splitting the mortgage pool into three sections and assigning a rating to each section. Investors 
who bought shares in the top tier—referred to as “AAA”—were the first to be paid when mortgage 
payments were made by homeowners. These investors were almost always guaranteed their 
money, but AAA rated CDO securities tended to not generate large amounts of cash. The second 
tier—the “B” level—had a potentially higher pay-out to investors, but if mortgage lenders were not 
able collect the minimum amount of money needed from homeowners, these investors were not 
paid at all. The lowest tier—often referred to as “toxic waste”—allowed for the highest potential 
rate of return, but was the riskiest to invest in. Investors who bought shares in toxic mortgages 
were essentially engaged in high-risk gambling; they faced high pay-outs if mortgages were paid, 
but they also faced a high likelihood of not making anything at all. CDOs changed the way in 
which investment banks made their investments:  
“[They] allowed lenders to get around the loan quality problem by hiding the crappiness of 
their loans behind the peculiar alchemy of the collateralized structure... now the relative 
appeal of a mortgage-based investment was not based on the individual borrower’s 
ability to pay over the long term; instead, it was based on computations like ‘what is the 
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likelihood that more than ninety-three out of one hundred homeowners with credit scores 
of at least 660 will default on their loans next month” (100).  
 
This situation becomes even more problematic when you begin to understand just how 
the rating agencies functioned in rating the CDOs. The investment banks financed the same 
rating agencies that were rating their mortgage pools, and obviously, they were more likely to give 
a higher rating to packages that didn’t deserve a high rating. Goldman Sachs, for example, 
pooled together 8,274 mortgages in 2006 in a package called the “GSAMP Trust 2006-S3.” Of 
the mortgages in this package, the loan-to-value was 99.21%, meaning that the homeowners who 
had taken out these mortgages had paid less than 1% in down payment. 58% of these mortgage 
loans were considered “no-doc” or “low-doc,” “meaning there was little or no documentation, no 
proof that the owners were occupying the homes, were employed, or had access to any money at 
all” (86). Obviously, the mortgages in this package were toxic and practically destined to fail. 
However, 68% of the mortgages within this package were given a AAA rating. Moody’s, one of 
the two major rating agencies, came up with an excuse in May of 2008 that blamed a “computer 
error” on the over-rating of countless mortgage packages.  
Taibbi then relates how this entire structure of mortgage loans, securitization, and CDOs 
exists in context to the story told earlier of the Williams family and how they were conned by 
“mortgage expert” Solomon Edwards. The whole process begins with a mortgage broker like 
Edwards, who works with a mortgage lender to issue a loan to a homeowner. At this level, 
mortgage brokers and lenders (like Edwards) are only interested in the immediate money that 
they can make for themselves. By issuing risky loans, they in-turn make more commission. From 
this level, the mortgage is sold off to an investment bank who then groups it into a securitized 
pool, where it can then be sold off to bigger investors. Because the lowest rated securities see 
the the biggest potential cash return, there was a big interest by investors to buy shares of toxic 
mortgages. Taibbi explains the motivations to make such an investment: everybody involved is 
only concerned about the short-term benefits, and not thinking about the long-term sustainability 
of investment structures. Investors could:  
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“buy the waste, cash in on the large returns for a while... and hope the homeowners... 
can keep making their pathetic 1 percent payments just long enough that that the hedge 
fund can eventually unload their loans on someone else before they start defaulting” (90). 
  
This short-term mentality existed throughout the entire chain of mortgage loans, and everybody 
involved seemed only interested in making a quick buck. The people at the bottom of this chain—
people like the Williamses—were ultimately hurt the most by this short-term lust for easy money.  
Taibbi then goes onto explain how credit default swaps played an important role in the 
financial collapse. Credit default swaps, he explains, are a type of insurance policy that are 
essentially bets on a specific outcome in the market. The basic idea is that two bankers get 
together and bet against each on whether or not a homeowner will default on his or her mortgage. 
Banker A agrees to make a fixed payment every month to Banker B for a given length of time, so 
long as the mortgage isn’t defaulted on. If the homeowner defaults on their mortgage, Banker B 
has to pay Banker A the full amount of the original loan that was given to the homeowner. This 
used to be a simple insurance tool for banks, but two developments turned credit default swaps 
into a way to make large sums of money for investors. First off, no regulations existed to make 
sure that at least one of the parties involved in the credit default swap had a financial stake in the 
bond being bet on. Taibbi explains that this lack of regulation allowed banks to gamble on bonds 
in way that was similar to “allowing people to buy life insurance on total strangers with late-stage 
lung cancer” (98). The second problem with credit default swaps was the fact that a bank did not 
have to have any money at all before it sold credit default swap insurance. Taibbi then goes on to 
say that this type of conduct by Wall Street was worse than the activities of a casino (something 
Wall Street has routinely been compared to). Casinos, Taibbi explains, at least do “not allow 
people to place bets they can’t cover” (98).  
“Hot Potato” is an engaging chapter of Griftopia that has the ability to convey both an 
emotional and intellectually engaging back-story of some of the individual factors that led to the 
financial meltdown. By telling the story of how Eljon Williams was duped into agreeing to a 
subprime mortgage against his knowledge, Taibbi is able to create a compassionate face that his 
audience can sympathize with. This humanistic element is exactly the story that we want to be 
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able to tell in our film. It grounds the narrative of complex financial processes in something 
relateable and emotional, and it defines Wall Street’s abuses in humanistic terms; it also 
illustrates the short-sighted policies and tactics that existed to make quick money off of innocent 
people.  
One thing becomes readily apparent when reading Williams’s story: the entire chain 
structure related to subprime mortgage lending is essentially based on the principle of 
disregarding the long-term sustainability of said structure. From the top to the bottom, the 
individuals involved were more concerned with lining their own pockets than looking out for the 
“little guy” or the overall sustainability of the system. This is not just a systemic problem, but also 
a moral pitfall of those trying to make money on Wall Street. It will be important for us as a group 
to be able speak about these notions of corporate greed, but we need to be mindful that our 
purpose in this film is to talk about how these systemic and moral problems ultimately affected the 
innocent or unknowing homeowners at the bottom of the chain.  
Another important point to take away from “Hot Potato,” is that it illustrates exactly how 
the entire financial system in the United States had eventually become assembled into a row of 
dominoes, waiting to be pushed over. Wall Street had essentially figured out how to make money 
off of making money, and in turn created a system that couldn’t last. When homeowners began 
defaulting on their mortgages, it sent shockwaves through the entire U.S. financial market. 
Because the mortgage industry had become so intertwined with other forms of investments, there 
was no way that investment banks could escape unscathed if homeowners started defaulting on 
their mortgages. When this finally happened in 2008, the government had to step in to fix the 
situation.  
Popular author Michael Lewis was a bond salesman on Wall Street during the 1980s, and 
wrote about the crisis in his 2010 book entitled The Big Short. The Big Short explores and 
attempts to answer exactly who knew about the forthcoming crisis in 2008, and ultimately, who 
benefitted from that knowledge.  
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The book begins with Lewis’s story of speaking to Meredith Witney, a financial adviser, 
who lists a man named Steve Eisman as one of the figures who made billions off of betting 
against subprime mortgages—the same type mortgages that were sinking Citigroup. The book 
shifts perspective, and then begins to tell the life story of Steve Eisman, an analyst at 
Oppenheimer securities. Eisman had believed that subprime lending was initially a good thing for 
lower-class Americans because it would move them away from higher interest rates with credit 
card debt, and to lower interest rates on mortgage debt. However, after hiring a man named 
Vinny Daniel to look into subprime lending, Eisman discovered that “subprime lending companies 
were growing so rapidly, and using such goofy accounting, that they could mask the fact that they 
had no real earnings, just illusory, accounting-driven, ones” (16). Eisman wrote a report about this 
in 1997, trashing subprime originators, and explaining that the numbers and statistics made 
public were in fact much different than the actual figures.  
Eisman then investigated lending giant Household Finance Corporation in 2002 and 
discovered how it was making a fortune off of second mortgages. By dishonestly offering 15-year 
loans that were “bizarrely disguised” as 30-year loans, Household could essentially double the 
effective interest rates of those they lent to. While Eisman’s investigation of Household revealed 
the deceitful tactics at-play in consumer lending, it also revealed the unwillingness of the 
government to prosecute against lenders who engaged in deceptive lending tactics. In a 
discussion with the Attorney General’s office of Washington state, Eisman discovered that the 
government was unwilling to prosecute against Household because “[they were] a powerful 
company... if they’re gone, who would make subprime loans in the state of Washington” (18)?  
By 2004, Eisman was finally coming to the conclusion that consumer finance existed to 
essentially rip people off. In 2005, he had assembled a team to run his new hedge fund, and after 
meeting with major players on Wall Street, they all “shared a sense that a great many people 
working on Wall Street couldn’t possibly understand what they were doing” (23). Instead of taking 
a learning lesson from the subprime market crash of the 1990s, Wall Street was issuing subprime 
mortgages at sightarming rate, and that the vast majority of these loans were being repackaged 
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as mortgage bonds. Subprime lending was at an all time high, and counter-intuitive to that, 
interest rates were rising. Eisman had also discovered that the terms of subprime loans had 
changed dramatically; while subprime mortgages had historically been issued mostly as fixed-
rates, 75% of subprime loans were floating-rate by 2005. By this time, all major Wall Street 
investment banks were “deep into the subprime game” (24).  Eisman saw how this lending 
structure was unsustainable, and knew that he could make substantial amount of money by short 
selling the stocks of investment banks when homeowners started defaulting. Eisman, along with a 
few other individuals, was able to see the collapse coming, and they made millions of dollars 
through short-selling and credit default swaps. 
The Big Short re-enforces the major themes that emerged from Taibbi’s “Hot Potato” 
chapter in Griftopia. There was a general short-sightedness by banks and investors to make 
quick money, and in an attempt to generate more money, banks were repackaging bad subprime 
loans into mortgage bonds and selling them off to other investors. The Big Short also re-enforces 
the fact that mortgage lenders were using deceitful tactics to loan to homeowners at the bottom; 
by pushing bad mortgages, lenders could make much more money. The unwillingness of 
government to step-in and take action against practices that seemed outright fraudulent is 
another theme that emerges from Griftopia. But, the most important thing to probably take away 
from The Big Short is that there were the individual people who foresaw the eventual collapse 
and were able to make money off of it.  
 Andrew Ross Sorkin’s book Too Big To Fail provides a detailed narrative of the financial 
bailout from the perspective of the major banks and government officials who had to bail them 
out. The last chapter of the book deals with the infamous meeting that took place between Henry 
Paulson and the CEOs of the “Big 9” Wall Street firms.  The chapter begins with Secretary of the 
Treasury Hank Paulson speaking with Chairman of the FDIC Sheila Bair, Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke, and President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Tim 
Geithner. Speaking with them in his office, Paulson ran through the talking points of their 
impending meeting with the “Big 9” CEOs. The most important aspect of their discussion was 
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TARP—the Troubled Aset Relief Program, which would bail the banks out—something Sorkin 
calls the “equivalent of welfare checks, earmarked for the bigget banks in the nation” (521). 
Paulson, still preparing for his meeting, recited one of his talking points that he was about deliver 
to deliver to the CEOs:  
“To encourage wide participation, the program is designed to provide an attractive source 
of capital, on identical terms, to all qualifying financial institutions. We plan to announce 
the program tomorrow—and—that you nine firms will be the initial participants We will 
state clearly that you are healthy institutions, participating in order to support the U.S. 
economy” (522). 
 
Geithner believed that this approach was too soft, and that the language needed to be toughened 
in order to get the CEOs to agree to their terms. To him, the pitch could not be interpreted as 
optional.  Paulson agreed, and a new talking point was drafted:  
“This is a combined program (bank liability and capital purchase). Your firms need to 
agree to both... We don’t believe it is tenable to opt out because doing so would leave 
you vulnerable and exposed... If capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware 
that your regulator will require it in any circumstance” (522).  
 
 Paulson, Bair, Geithner, and Bernanke wondered if the CEOs would agree. When the 
“Big 9” CEOs arrived at Paulson’s office, it was the first (and possibly only) time in history that the 
most powerful heads of American finance were gathered in the same room. Paulson proceeded 
to tell them that they needed to accept the TARP money:  
“We regret having to take these actions... but let me be clear: If you don’t take it and you 
aren’t able to raise the capital that they say you need in the market, then I’m going to give 
you a second helping and you’re not going to like the terms on that... This is the right 
thing to do for the country” (524).  
 
Many of the CEOs who were wondering why Paulson had arranged the meeting quickly realized 
what was happening. Ken Lewis, CEO of Bank of America, was the first executive to voice his 
opinion on why they should all sign. He explained there there was “a lot to like and dislike about 
the program,” but if they didn’t have a “healthy fear of the unknown, then [they were] crazy” (526). 
He finished by saying that everyone knew they “were all going sign” (526). Bernanke immediately 
followed by saying that the country was in the worst financial shape since the Great Depression, 
and asked everyone to look out for the common good. John Mack, head of Morgan Stanley, 
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asked for the paper and signed his name. Within 40 minutes, seven out of eight of the other 
CEOs signed on. Within hours, everyone was on-board. 
 The epilogue to Too Big to Fail mentions the impact that TARP had on the American 
economy, and addresses the public discourse concerning the relationship between the 
government and capitalism. By bailing out the major banks, the United States government had 
become a major share-holder of the most important American financial institutions. The public 
was uneasy about this relationship, and Sorkin argues that what emerged was that “traditional 
political beliefs had been turned on their head” (530). President Bush, who signed the TARP bill, 
found himself in the un-Republican position of advocating for government intervention. The TARP 
money was not a panacea for all the country’s financial problems, however. Treasury officials 
referred to Citigroup as “the Death Star,” and the bank received another $20 billion on top of the 
$25 billion that it received in TARP money. Controversy erupted in early 2009 when Bank of 
America required another $20 billion bailout, even though billions of dollars worth of the original 
bailout money were used to pay executive bonuses. AIG ultimately ended up with $180 billion 
from the government, with no apparent way to be able to pay the money back. Coincidentally, 
AIG was looking more and more like the subprime homeowners who were unable to pay back 
their mortgages.  
 Sorkin ends his book by discussing whether or not the financial crisis could have been 
avoided. He doesn’t give a definitive answer yes or no, but says that the foundation for the 
financial meltdown had been laid down long before Secretary Paulson took office in 2006. A 
variety of factors such as “deregulation of the banks in the 1990s... the push to increase 
homeownership... and the system of Wall Street compensation that rewarded short-term risk 
taking” all contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 (534). Sorkin ends with the notion that 
studying the financial crisis is important, but only if that knowledge is used to better the financial 
structures of our economy. If we don’t apply the lessons learned from the financial meltdown, 
then we are doomed to repeat our mistakes.  
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 Because Too Big to Fail gives a glimpse into the lives of the public and private sector 
individuals who were directly involved with the crisis and the resulting bailout, it is a good 
resource for us to use. It gives a unique insider perspective of the whole situation and the 
individuals involved. Although our documentary won’t focus on the extremely small details like 
Too Big to Fail does, the book serves an important purpose in highlighting several key things. 
One of the most important things to take away from Too Big to Fail, is that the bailout may have 
prevented a catastrophic meltdown of our financial system. This is an interesting issue, because 
of the opposition by many to the very thought of government bailouts. However, Too Big to Fail 
frames the government intervention as a type of necessary evil. This then raises the question of 
what exactly the future of the government’s role is in regulating the markets. How will the 
government make sure that something like this never happens again? The relationship between 
the government and the markets is something that will be important for us to explore in our film, 
and Too Big to Fail provides a thought-provoking framework to work from.  
 
Content Structure 
Our film will follow a three act structure from which the emotional arc of the film will be 
based.  Preceding the first act in the film, an introduction will include a brief emotional hook that 
relates a personal story about a family or individual who was affected by the financial crisis (i.e. 
personal bankruptcy or foreclosure). Following the hook, the first act will include a 
background/educational piece depicting the relevant facts which orient the audience with the 
basic information necessary to understanding how financial structures and policies led up to the 
crisis itself.  A whiteboard animation will be used to simplify the storytelling of this process.  We 
will also use portions of participant interviews to piece together this brief explanation by asking a 
control question in every interview such as: how do you believe the financial crisis was 
caused?  This section will utilize scholarly interviews to essentially bring the viewer up to speed. 
            The second act will be the introduction to the story lines. The main purpose of this section 
is to identify who was affected by the financial crisis. Creative interlacing between categorical 
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elements of policy, business, citizenship and education will string together interviews with 
legislators, educators, business operators, authors, and “disaffected” individuals to hedge tension 
between conflicting interests of said parties. We will vary the emotional message conveyed 
through each story in order to bring the viewer through several emotional arcs.  For instance, we 
will identify a person who has been devastated by the outcomes of the financial crisis juxtaposed 
to an entrepreneur who has survived in the fragile financial landscape, both of which will provide 
a separate element of emotion vital to the story behind the crisis.  Our goal in act two is to identify 
subjects from each category to present the emotional impact the crisis has had on the wide 
spectrum of individuals and organizations. 
            To segue into the third act we will explore what the aforementioned individuals are doing 
as a result of the financial crisis and the changes that have taken place in their lives.  Likely, the 
documentary will include the American who has lost their home is in search of a new job and 
trying to keep a roof over their head. However, we also hope to find the entrepreneur may have 
found ways to prosper, innovate, and inspire.  This act will personalize these situations and help 
viewers conceptualize meaningful insights into potential solutions to the systemic problems we 
face. It is our desire that the individuals viewing the film come out of it with an increased 
knowledge of the situation at hand, but more importantly to inspire viewers to actively engage the 
financial environment. 
            We understand that the content structure in documentary filmmaking is often  created by 
organic means. Therefore, this three-act structure will only be used as a model or guide in the 
filmmaking process. As stories develop it is necessary to adapt as unforeseen stories and ideas 
unfold. To account for this we believe the act structure may also be modeled through the control 
questions we ask our interviewees. To contextualize our human interest stories, we will also 
approach a range of policy experts  to link the financial environment to the human element. It is 
crucial to keep in mind that the content structure will be a continually evolving process throughout 





            We expect to travel locally for this documentary and it is important for us to determine 
parameters for personnel and equipment as an integral part of the pre-production phase of the 
project. There are four of us involved in producing this documentary, we feel it is possible and 
necessary to have all members available for each shoot. We want to provide equal opportunity for 
crew members to travel to various locations and plan to travel locally to complete the interviews 
during production. We will always be mindful that the following four roles are covered on each 
shoot: 
            - Director/Director of Photography (Will, Pete) 
            - Sound/Script Supervisor (Johnny) 
            - Producer/Runner (Will, Johnny) 
            - Interviewer (Johny, Will , Pete) 
We were able to purchase two Panasonic AG-AF100 cameras.  We have budgeted $9,590 for the 
purchase of these two cameras. Through extensive research we have come to the conclusion 
that this camera offers the highest quality image combined with the most significant value to suit 
our project. We believe the purchase is necessary to create dynamic interviews from multiple 
visual angles, which in turn will help facilitate editing. The use of two cameras will also allow us to 
maximize the footage we can capture in different locations. Three Panasonic lenses (7 -14mm, 
14-45mm, 14-140mm) have also been allocated to the budget at a total of $2,012. The three 
lenses will provide varying visual perspectives and will be interchangeable between cameras. We 
have chosen three lenses, a wide angle, medium length, and zoom, each of which will offer 
unique perspectives in keeping up with industry standards.  The different lenses will offer varying 
depths of field that will add to the stylistic qualities we intend to capture.  Additionally two 
specialty support rigs have been included. The cine-slider and shoulder mount will enable us to 
create the style we envision and are industry standard when producing documentaries. In attempt 
to avoid the “talking head” issue inherent in interview based documentaries, the cine-slider will 
allow us to create dynamic and engaging visuals.  Additional production equipment for lighting 
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and audio collection has been allocated in the budget and can be referred to in Appendix B. It is 
our desire to create the most visually appealing content possible and avoid stagnant shot 
composition. 
            The production equipment will become property of the University of Denver to be used in 
future projects similar to this endeavor. 
 
Post-production Process 
            Post-production will be done at the University of Denver Film Media and Journalism 
Department. This will provide the project with adequate non-linear computer tools to complete 
compilation and editing.  To utilize the schools facilities, we will work closely with Bob Yablans 
and Rodney Buxton to arrange proper access to equipment. This will also provide a centralized 
location for the group to work on the project.  The editing process will be done as a group, but 
there will be two primary editors (Pete and Will) in an effort to keep a consistent flow and style 
throughout the work. 
            For the animation section of the introduction, we have chosen to approach the Digital 
Media Studies department in the hope they will be able to help create an animation. Rodney 
Buxton has been in touch with the Digital Media Studies department and we are hopeful that one 
of their students will want to help us out with this project. 
            Another aspect of the post-production process that we are addressing during the pre-
production phase is the need for narration.  We are hoping to capture most of our audio content 
during the interview process, but when we use custom graphics we will need to use narration for 
clarification. We have built voiceover talent into the budget and we feel it is important to hire 
someone who has experience and can add value to the film. 
            We have also budgeted for stock footage and news footage licensing, which we believe 
gives the film authenticity and historical context.  Our vision is to create a historical video 
montage of news stories from the financial crisis at the beginning of the film, to give perspective 
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on the scope and complexity of the crisis.  To do so, we will need to license the rights to news 
footage. 
 
Marketing and Distribution Plan 
            The following comprises the current marketing & distribution strategy for the independent 
documentary being produced by students of the University of Denver based on current available 
information regarding the scope, target market/audience and budget for the film. As mentioned in 
the introduction, the creative process inherent in producing a successful documentary film 
requires reasonable accommodation on the part of all parties to adjust marketing strategies on 
the fly. The end goal of our marketing and distribution plan is to reach as large and broad an 




            We believe the target audience will be anyone who is interested in one of the greatest 
economic recessions to hit the United States. While the financial crisis has had a global impact,  it 
has affected EVERYONE on some level in this country,  from bottom to top and across different 
social categories.  While we hope that the documentary has the potential to attract audiences with 
varied social backgrounds, we are envisioning an audience with a youthful edge, comprised of an 
intelligent, educated individuals. 
            As stated above, the target audience of the film may shift during production as the scope 
narrows. Initial information suggests both a primary and a secondary target audience. The 
primary target market is 18-34 year olds, 50/50 male-female split, college educated (either in 
progress or completed), and has an above-average disposable income. Based on the style and 
content we envision, this target audience is most adapt to connect with the film.  We believe that 
our perspective on the financial collapse, viewed through student lens, is unique to the current 
landscape of films exploring the collapse and will be well received by our target market.  The 25-
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65 age range is our secondary market. This target market will overlap with and extend beyond 




         The overarching strategy regarding the marketing of this film is to generate awareness of 
the film among all relevant target market groups, including but not limited to: University of Denver 
students, members of the Denver metro area business community, Colorado residents, business 
school students (undergraduate and graduate), and current and future professionals working in 
the areas of finance, banking, education, and public policy. We will provide opportunities for 
previously mentioned target market groups to engage with the film through the following means: 
film festivals, local screenings and events, broadcasts of the film through appropriate channels 
such as public television (PBS – Independent Lens, BBC), network television (NBC, CBS, FOX 
and ABC), cable television (HBO, Showtime, IFC, Sundance Channel, G4, Discovery, History, 
CNBC, MSNBC, etc) youth-oriented cable stations (MTV, Nick at Night), Internet/Social Media 
(Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Living Social, Buzznet, Flixster, Focus.com, Linked-In, etc.), Getty 
Museum, and any and all academic environments.  The group is also affiliated with The 
International Documentary Association and DocMovies.com, which offers help in various ways 
and assists in screenings and distribution. 
 
Market Distribution Scope 
            There are a number of other documentary films exploring the financial crisis, most notably 
Academy Award nominated filmmaker Charles Ferguson’s “Inside Job.” Produced for 
approximately US $2M, “Inside Job” has been viewed by nearly 350,000 people and has a 
domestic gross of over US $3.1M. Overall, the market for independent documentaries has been 
saturated as rapid technological advances have made it possible for anyone to produce a 
documentary, thereby lowering traditional barriers to entry. The majority of independent 
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documentaries cater to niche markets, increasing the ability to selectively message the target 
audience; the disadvantage being the concurrent limiting of the target market size as well as the 
dissemination of important information.  This film is needed because the existing documentaries 
we have researched surrounding the financial crisis are centered on Wall Street, greed, and 
government policy, but ignore the human element.  We hope to provide refreshing, new 
perspectives through real people with varied experiences and backgrounds. 
 
Film Festivals 
            Entering the finished film into competitive film festivals, both national and international, is 
a key component of this marketing plan. Success at film festivals has the potential to significantly 
raise the awareness and profile for this independent documentary film. A list of target film 
festivals with pertinent information (timing, costs, etc) can be found in the appendices. 
  
Social Media 
            The social media strategic plan and according tactics will be developed in coming months 
as the scope and target audience of the film comes into sharper focus. However, we believe the 
possibilities are endless for reaching many viewers through social media.  Innovative social 
media outlets will be utilized, including Twitter and Facebook.   This will be an adaptive process, 
beginning during the pre-production phase and ending with the marketing and distribution phase. 
  
Distribution 
            There is no shortage of options and opportunities regarding distribution of the film. The 
probability of securing wide theatrical release for this film is low, negating the need to focus on 
leasing (the distributor agrees to pay a fixed amount for the rights to distribute the film) or profit-
sharing situations (the distributor gets a percentage, typically anywhere from 10 to 50 percent, of 
the net profits made from the movie). The more likely scenario is one that combines grass roots 
physical and digital distribution planning. The traditional distribution method is through physical 
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distribution. Physical distribution includes contacting libraries, universities, business networks and 
other interested groups to secure contacts. A physical DVD would then be sent to each contact 
as a demo copy. Digital distribution is an attractive addition to, or possibly substitution for, a 
traditional physical distribution plan because, after an upfront investment of labor for setup, 
technology can be leveraged to minimize additional labor costs. Through a basic digital 
distribution plan, we can make the film available for instant download, and available from the 
online vendors like iTunes, Amazon.com, and Netflix. 
 
Conclusion 
 The financial crisis is a multi-faceted problem, with many different angles, and as 
filmmakers we are trying to pursue what we think will be interesting for our audience. The 
framework we have set forward will help keep us focused and on-track with our overall goals. We 
feel that we have done a good amount of research on the financial crisis, and that we are now 
ready to make major strides on this project. While there are already several books and movies 
out there about the financial crisis, we feel that ours has a unique value in that it is grounded in 
the humanistic element of how people were affected. Surely, we will be looking at many of the 
systemic issues that caused the financial crisis and continue to threaten our economic system, 







Capitalism: A Love Story. Dir. Michael Moore. The Weinstein Company, 2010. DVD. 
Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room. Dir. Alex Gibney. Magnolia Pictures, 2005. DVD. 
Frontline: Inside the Meltdown. Dir. Michael Kirk. PBS Home Video, 2009. DVD. 
I.O.U.S.A. Dir. Patrick Creadon. Roadside Attractions, 2009. DVD. 
Inside Job. Dir. Charles H. Ferguson. Sony Pictures Classics, 2011. DVD. 
Lewis, Michael. The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. New York:  W.W.              
Norton & Company, 2010. 
Lowenstein, Roger. The End of Wall Street. New York: Penguin Books, 2011. 
Maxed Out. Dir. James Scurlock. Magnolia Pictures, 2007. DVD. 
Sorkin, Andrew Ross. Too Big to Fail. New York: Penguin Books, 2010. 
Taibbi, Matt. Griftopia: Bubble Machines, Vampire Squids, and the Long Con That is              
Breaking America. New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
